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Abstract 
Essays on Financial Contagion and Regime Shifts 
Huimin Li 
Bang N. Jeon, Ph.D. 
Thomas C. Chiang, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
This study reexamines the Asian stock market contagion by employing a dynamic 
multivariate GARCH model. Based on a commonly held definition, contagion is defined 
as a significant increase in comovements between asset returns across markets. By 
analyzing the correlation coefficient series, this paper identifies two phases of the Asian 
crisis. The first phase shows an increase in correlation (contagion) and the second phase 
shows continued high correlation (herding).  Statistical analysis of correlation 
coefficients shows both the level and the variance shifts, providing evidence of contagion 
effect and casting some doubt on the benefit of international portfolio diversifications 
during the crises. 
This study further explores the contagion effects through sovereign rating changes 
during the crisis, i.e. how the sovereign rating changes in one country affected its own stock 
markets and stock markets in other Asian crisis countries. Using the sovereign rating changes 
announced by Standard & Poor’s during the period from 1990 to 2003, the panel estimation 
finds that overall, rating changes do not show strong evidence of a pro-cyclical tendency 
during the crisis period. However, the contagion effect was found to exist in the sense 
that rating changes in one country affect the stock markets in other crisis countries. 
During the crisis, the contagion effect was coming from the instances of upgrades; no 
comparable evidence has been found in the cases of downgrades. One possible 
 ix
explanation is the market expectations in the downside of the market. Event study further 
confirms the contagion effects during the crisis period. 
Lastly, this study contributes to the literature by studying the contagion effects 
from the currency markets to the stock markets. The non-linear relationship between 
exchange rate changes and stock returns is examined by using various specifications of 
Markov regime-switching models. The models endogenously distinguish two different 
regimes. The exchange rate exposure of the national stock returns is mainly through the 
real channel in tranquil period and through financial channel in volatile periods.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In 1997 and 1998, the economic and financial crisis hit many Asian countries and 
plunged some of the most rapidly growing and successful economies into financial 
turbulence and deep economic depression. A remarkable feature of the crisis is how 
rapidly it spread from one country to another in the region and further to Russia and 
some South American countries. Most of the Asian countries severely hit by the crisis 
had been pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar or a basket of currencies in which the 
U.S. dollar dominated before the crisis. However, after several weeks of speculative 
attacks, the Bank of Thailand announced on July 2, 1997 a managed float of the Baht and 
called for IMF’s assistance. Following the collapse of the Thailand Baht, the financial 
markets (including both currency markets and stock markets) of Southeast Asia faced 
increasing pressure, which was reflected in the managed floating of the currencies in the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia in late July and August 1997.  
As the crisis deepened, panic spread among both foreign and domestic creditors 
and investors and the foreign exchange and stock market turmoil spread to the entire 
region, culminating in the collapse of the Korean won on November 17. During this 
period, even some more developed economies suffered from the turmoil, such as Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan. Over the interval from July 2 to December 31, the 
domestic equity indices for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan dropped in the range from 9% to 70%, and 
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the local currencies also depreciated against the U.S. dollar as large as almost 70% 
(except Hong Kong, which keeps its currency board exchange rate system). 1  
The turmoil in the financial markets in these countries led to capital flowing out 
of the region with billions of short-term bank loans recalled in the second half of 1997. 
The Asian crisis was followed by the Russian crisis as Russia government defaulted its 
debt in August 1998, and further by crises in Turkey, Brazil and Argentina. However, the 
Asian crisis is still the most severe one, in terms of how fast the crisis spread within the 
region and the number of countries involved. Within five months, eight Asian countries 
were affected. Before the occurrence of the Asian crisis, all these Asian economies had 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals and none of the agencies, such as IMF, World Bank, 
and ADB, had been able to foresee the impending event. Therefore this thesis is going to 
focus on how the shocks are transmitted across different financial markets among these 
Asian countries during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. 
The international transmission of financial market shocks has been a hot topic in 
the academic area since the Asian crisis. The word “contagion” has been used extensively 
after that to describe the significant increase in financial market comovement or linkages. 
In response to the contagion phenomenon, the empirical research has developed into two 
different paths.  
The first path has focused on whether there are increases in market comovement 
of asset returns during the crises (e.g. King and Wadhwani, 1990; Baig and Goldfajn, 
1998; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Corsetti et al., 2002). The second chapter in this thesis 
                                                 
1 The drop in domestic stock returns for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan is 42%, 60%, 70%, 39%, 73%, 35%, 24%, 9%, and 28% respectively 
while the depreciation of local currency for these countries is 51%, 59%, 43%, 41%, 65%, 0.03%, 16%, 
16%, and 13% respectively, versus the U.S. dollar. 
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is trying to reexamine the increases in correlation of stock returns in several Asian 
countries during the crisis by taking into account the heteroskedasticity issue directly. 
Chapter 2 contributes to the contagion literature by estimating the time-varying 
correlation coefficients and presenting some evidence of contagion effects. In addition, 
the source of contagion is investigated and identified during the sub-periods of the crisis.  
Chapter 3, on the other hand, focuses on the second path, which examines the 
contagion effects through specific transmission channels. In the literature, papers 
focusing on different transmission channels find evidence in contagion effects (e.g. Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) using bank funds data, Froot et al. (1999) using portfolio 
flows, Basu (2002) using bond market data). However, only a few papers addressed the 
role of sovereign credit rating changes in transmitting shocks across stock markets. The 
sovereign rating downgrades during the crisis are often blamed to aggravate the crisis. 
This argument is tested using panel data from five most severely hit countries. Whether 
there are contagion effects due to sovereign credit rating changes in other countries is 
also examined.  
As observed, the Asian crisis started with large devaluation of the Thailand baht 
and then spread to the financial markets in other countries. The contagion effects across 
different assets (currencies and stocks) are studied in Chapter 4. Regime switching model 
is used to endogenously determine different regimes and examines the different exchange 
rate exposures of the national stock returns at different regimes. Since the exchange rate 
systems in most of the crisis countries changed from the pegged system to the managed 
floating system during the crisis, the contagion effects from the currency markets to the 
stock markets are different.  
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Chapter 2. Empirical Analysis of Financial Contagion 
– Evidence from the Asian Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
During the Asian financial crisis, the financial markets in the crisis-hit countries 
displayed significant comovements and the financial shocks transmitted across the 
markets in a short time. This chapter focuses on whether there is financial contagion 
across these Asian countries, which has important implications for policy makers who 
concern the financial stability and investors who concern the risks involved in their 
investments. 
However, there exists disagreement on whether there is contagion or not in the 
literature. Some studies show a significant increase in correlation coefficients during 
crises and conclude that there exists contagion effect (for example, Baig and Goldfajn, 
1998). Others find that after accounting for heteroskedasticity, there is no significant 
increase in correlation between asset returns of two crisis countries, reaching the 
conclusion of “no contagion, only interdependence” (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; 
Bordo and Murshid, 2001; Basu, 2002). 2 However, Corsetti, et al. (2002), using a single 
factor model, find “some contagion, some interdependence” in their tests of financial 
contagion. In addition, papers focusing on different transmission channels find evidence 
of contagion effects (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) using bank funds data, 
Froot et al. (1999) using portfolio flows, Basu (2002) using bond market data, Forbes 
(2000) using firm level data, Kaminsky et al. (2000) using mutual fund data).  
                                                 
 
2 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define contagion as significant increases in cross-market comovement. Any 
continued high level of market correlation suggests strong linkages between the two economies that exist in 
all states of the world, and is defined as interdependence. 
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By using a multivariate GARCH model on high frequency data in nine Asian 
countries, this chapter deals with the heteroskedasticity and endogeneity problems in the 
linear models used in the literature and derives the pair-wise time-varying conditional 
correlation series among the stock returns in the crisis countries. These correlation series 
identify various major events during the sample period and different phases during the 
Asian crisis. Furthermore, in order to examine the dynamic relationship among asset 
returns, a VAR system is established and then the variance decomposition analysis show 
which country has the most explanatory power of stock return variation during different 
phases of the crisis.  
The major findings of this chapter are as follows. First, this study finds some 
evidence of contagion, in contrast with the strong conclusion “no contagion, only 
interdependence” in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) but consistent with the perceptions 
during the Asian crisis. Second, two different phases of the crisis can be identified. The 
first phase shows a process of increasing correlations from the start of the crisis to 
November 17, 1997 and provides evidence of contagion from the earlier crisis-hit 
countries to other countries. The second phase shows a high level of correlation from the 
end of 1997 to 1998 and provides evidence of herding behavior by the investors. Third, 
the sources of contagion during the different phases of the crisis are analyzed. In the 
early phase, Malaysia transmitted more shocks to the neighboring countries, while in the 
second, Hong Kong and Thailand seemed to have more influence. Last, the evidence 
from the Japanese stock market suggests that the contagion from the crisis countries to 
Japan started much later in 1998 and the magnitude was smaller, compared to that among 
the emerging economies.  
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on financial 
contagion during the crisis. Forbes and Rigobon’s method is briefly introduced. Section 
2.3 describes the data used in this study and explains different characteristics of 
correlation coefficients before and after the Asian crisis. The methodology of a 
multivariate GARCH model is presented in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 explains the 
estimation results. Section 2.6 describes a VAR model and analyzes the results of 
variance decomposition. Section 2.7 presents conclusions and further extensions. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The research on financial contagion has developed into two paths. The first focuses 
on the theoretical modeling of the transmission channels of financial shocks during crises. 
The second stresses on econometric refinements and attempts to provide more updated 
empirical evidence of financial contagion based on correlation analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Channels of Transmitting Shocks 
In the contagion literature, there are several main channels through which shocks 
are transmitted due to investor behavior in financial markets (Pritsker, 2001). Correlated 
information channel argues that if two countries have real links, such as trade-investment 
linkages or industry linkages, then negative information in one country may lead to asset 
selling and price declines in the other market, which is often amplified by information 
asymmetry (see von Furstenberg and Jeon, 1989; King and Wadhwani, 1990). The wake-
up call hypothesis, however, does not assume any real linkages between countries (see 
Sachs et al., 1995; Wolf, 1999). It argues that if one country with certain macroeconomic 
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characteristics, such as a weak banking sector, is discovered to be vulnerable to a 
currency crisis, then investors will reassess the risk of other countries with similar 
fundamentals even if these investors have not changed their risk tolerance.  
The second channel is the liquidity channel. Since international investors hold 
portfolio positions in different markets, when they have a capital loss in one market, they 
have to sell assets in other markets not directly related with the crisis country to meet 
certain requirements, such as margin calls (Claessens et al., 2001; Forbes, 2000).  
The third channel, the cross-market hedging channel was formally modeled in 
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) using a rational expectations model. They show that even if 
two countries have no common macroeconomic risk, their asset returns may still show 
strong comovement due to asymmetric information from different types of investors. In 
addition, Calvo and Mendoza (2000) demonstrate that globalization will increase two 
types of information frictions and exacerbates contagion due to information heterogeneity.  
The fourth channel is the wealth effect channel. Kyle and Xiong (2001) formally 
model the wealth effect to explain the panic of hedge funds, banks and securities firms 
after the fall of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management. The short-term 
convergence traders become more risk averse when the noise traders cause an 
unfavorable shock to asset prices. They are able to liquidate large amount of risky 
positions across their whole portfolio as their wealth decreases, resulting in large price 
volatility and correlation between different markets.  
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However, direct empirical tests of these channels are difficult due to lack of 
microstructure data regarding investors.3 Therefore, many empirical studies of contagion 
effects turn to the study of asset return co-movement, which is a result of the above 
transmission channels and also observation during the crisis. In this study, contagion is 
defined as a significant increase in correlation between asset returns in different markets. 
 
2.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is important for diversification, risk management and the 
pricing of asset portfolios (Fong, 2003). Increased correlation during turbulent periods 
reduces the benefits of asset diversification and compromises the reliability of hedging 
operations based on historical correlations. It also undermines the risk management 
models that assume stable correlations. When correlation analysis is used to examine the 
existence of financial contagion, it also has policy implications for evaluating the role of 
international institutions. In the presence of liquidity crisis and its contagion, IMF 
intervention and dedication of massive amounts of money to bail-out funds could be 
justified (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003).  
There have been tests of increases in correlation coefficients for changes in 
interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices, and sovereign spreads across different markets. 
However, there has not been consensus on whether such co-movements increase after a 
crisis. Some studies find significant increases in correlations between asset returns in the 
crisis countries (e.g. Baig and Goldfajn, 1998; Park and Song, 2001). Others argue that 
                                                 
3 A companion paper by Chiang et al. (2003) looks at how sovereign credit rating changes affected the 
stock markets in the crisis countries. Sovereign credit rating changes in one country could trigger stock 
market decline in another country, especially during the turbulent period. This is consistent with the wake-
up call hypothesis and cross-market hedging hypothesis.  
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this increase may be due to an increase in volatility (see King and Wadhwani, 1990; 
Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Forbes and Rigobon (2002) (thereafter as F-R) formally 
propose a formula to correct correlation coefficients for heteroskedasticity. After 
accounting for that, the estimated correlation coefficients do not show significant 
increases. They claim that there is no contagion, but only interdependence. Some 
applications of this correction do find little evidence of contagion (e.g. Bordo and 
Murshid, 2001; Basu, 2002).  
Since F-R make a strong argument and are the first to address the 
heteroskedasticity issue formally, I will use an example to illustrate their point. They 
assume that stock returns in two countries during “tranquil” times are linearly related:  
ttt vrr ,1,210,1 ++= ββ  
where  and  are stock returns in countries 1 and 2 at time t, respectively, and  is 
a stochastic noise independent of r . The variance of r , covariance and the correlation 
between the two returns can be expressed as: 
tr ,1 tr ,2 tv ,1
t,2 1
)()()( 12
2
11 vVarrVarrVar += β  
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2
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These expressions show that if a crisis occurs in country 2 with increasing volatility in its 
stock market, it should be transmitted to country 1 with a rise in volatility and correlation 
of two returns.  
For this reason, F-R adjust the correlation coefficient as follows: 
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where ρ  is the unadjusted correlation coefficient (depending on the high or low 
volatility period), *ρ  is the adjusted correlation coefficient (regardless of the volatility), 
δ  is the relative increase in the variance of r , VAR  and VAR  are the variance 
of  in high volatility period and low volatility period, respectively. 
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Later, Corsetti et al. (2002) point out that the linear relationship assumed in F-R 
ignores the country-specific component of the change in the variance of the second 
country’s asset return. They establish a single factor model and develop a two-step 
conditional test for hypotheses of interdependence versus contagion. They find that there 
is some contagion and some interdependence. 4  However, a common problem 
encountered by these studies is that these tests are highly affected by the choice of 
window (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003). Also the choice of sub-samples conditioning on high 
and low volatility is both arbitrary and exposed to selection bias (Boyer et al., 1999).5  
In this chapter, a new procedure developed by Engle (2002) is used to examine 
whether there is a significant increase in the correlation of stock returns. Using a 
                                                 
 
4 The single factor model may not be true in the case that Kodres and Pritzker (2002) suggest. The latter 
argue that even if two countries do not have a common factor, contagion effect may still occur due to cross-
market hedging. In addition, the model in Corsetti et al. (2002) is still a linear model. 
5 Fong (2003) uses a bivariate regime-switching model by pairing the US stock market with four other 
major stock markets and allowing for correlations to switch endogenously as a function of volatility jumps 
of a particular country. It is found that the extent of correlation jumps is generally small and statistically 
significant for only Canada. However, it also admits that the model shares the same limitation as the 
previous literature in that it assumes one country (the US) to be the only source of volatility shocks. 
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multivariate GARCH model with time-varying conditional correlation, 6  it solves the 
heteroskedasticity problem addressed by F-R without having to divide the whole sample 
period into two sub-periods arbitrarily. It also avoids the endogeneity issue in many 
papers in the literature. For example, F-R assumes Hong Kong as the source of contagion. 
However, during the crisis news in each crisis country could trigger financial market 
turbulence in other neighboring countries. Using variance decomposition, this chapter 
further identifies the source of contagion at different stages of the crisis. 
 
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data collected from Datastream International are daily stock price indices 
from January 1, 1990 to March 21, 2003 for eight seriously affected Asian countries 
during the financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The stock indices used 
for these countries are Bangkok S.E.T. Index, Kuala Lumpur SE Index, Jakarta SE 
Composite Index, Philippines SE Composite Index, Korea SE Composite, Taiwan SE 
Weighted Index, Hang Seng Index, and Singapore Straits Times Index, respectively. Also 
included are two stock indices from industrial countries, Japan (Nikkei 225 Stock 
Average Index) and the United States (S&P 500 Composite Index). Japan was also 
affected by the Asian crisis, but at a much later stage and to a lesser extent. Whether 
there is financial contagion from the crisis countries to Japan and to what extent Japan’s 
                                                 
 
6  Another GARCH model with constant conditional correlation, proposed by Bollerslev (1990) and 
followed by Longin and Solnik (1995), can also be used to identify factors that affect the conditional 
correlation, but it can only deal with one factor at a time due to too many parameters. 
 12
stock market was affected are examined. The U.S. is included here mainly as a global 
factor. 
Stock returns are calculated as first differences of natural logs of each stock price 
index in local currency and expressed as percentages. Descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 2.1a. It can be seen that the US stock return has a standard deviation of 1.042, 
which is much lower than others, while stock returns of Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand 
have the highest volatility. Most of the series are highly skewed to the right, while the 
return series for the U.S. is skewed to the left. This shows that emerging markets have 
more positive extreme returns while the developed countries tend to have more negative 
ones. All of the series are highly leptokurtic and have fatter tails than normal distribution. 
The Jarque-Bera test indicates that none of the return series is normally distributed. 
Strong serial correlation is shown in significant Ljung-Box statistics. Table 2.1b lists the 
total market capitalization and total value traded at the end of 1996 for all these ten stock 
markets. Compared to the U.S. and Japan, other emerging economies have a much 
smaller stock market. Among those, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Korea have 
relatively large stock markets and trade more actively. Furthermore, Figure 2.1 shows 
clustering of large returns and this phenomenon has been widely modeled by GARCH 
type of models in the past decade literature (see Bollerslev et al. (1992) for a detailed 
survey).  
 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here] 
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Before turning to my methodology, Table 2.2a presents the simple pair-wise 
correlation matrix between the stock returns in the nine Asian countries. On July 2, 1997 
Thailand officially announced the depreciation of its currency Baht. It would be 
appropriate to use this date to break the whole sample period into two sub-periods. 
Results in Table 2.2a show that the pair-wise correlations between these countries 
increase uniformly except some correlations involving Malaysia.7 In order to test whether 
there is a significant increase in the correlation coefficients, correction for the 
heteroskedasticity problem suggested by F-R is used and then standard Z-test after Fisher 
Z-transformation is implemented.8 One problem with this correction is that the source of 
contagion has to be identified in advance. 9  This study uses both Thailand (with 
breakpoint of July 2 1997) and Hong Kong (with breakpoint of October 17 1997) as the 
source of contagion and the results are shown in Table 2.2b. In both cases, the contagion 
effect is not as significant as that before the adjustment of the correlation coefficients, but 
still some evidence of correlation increase after the crisis can be seen. In order to further 
test whether the source of contagion matters, the order that these crisis countries were 
                                                 
 
7 Malaysia imposed strict capital control soon after the crisis, so it is understandable that its stock return 
behavior after the crisis might be different from before the crisis. 
8  Morrison (1983) suggests the test statistic for null hypothesis of no increase in correlation: 
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approximately normally distributed and is fairly robust to non-normality of correlation coefficients. Basu 
(2002) and Corsetti et al (2002) have employed this test. 
9 F-R argue that during the Asian crisis, the events in Asia became headline news in the world only after 
Hong Kong’s market sharply declined in October 1997. Therefore they use Hong Kong as the only source 
of contagion and October 17, 1997 as the breakpoint of the whole sample period.  
19560 =N 14931 =N
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affected during the crisis is used to determine who is the source.10 Then increases in 31 
pair-wise correlation coefficients need to be tested.11 The results of the test are shown in 
Table 2.2c, which are pretty similar to that in Table 2b. The results show that before 
correction, 29 out of 31 correlation coefficients reject the null hypothesis of no 
correlation increase while after correction, only 16 out of 31 reject the null hypothesis at 
10% level.  
 
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
 
Preliminary analysis of the simple correlations here indicates that there is at least 
some contagion. But keep in mind that this simple correlation prevents the examination 
of the changes in the correlation matrix over time. Therefore multivariate GARCH 
models are employed to further pursue this issue. 
 
2.4 Methodology: Multivariate GARCH-DCC model 
This chapter employs a multivariate GARCH model with dynamic conditional 
correlation (DCC) that allows for time-varying conditional correlation, proposed by 
                                                 
 
10 The order of these countries is: Thailand (managed float of the baht on July 2, 1997), the Philippines (wider 
float of the peso on July 11, 1997), Malaysia (float of the ringitt on July 14, 1997), Indonesia (float of the 
rupiah on August 14, 1997), Singapore (large decline in stock market and currency market on August 28, 
1997), Taiwan (large decline in stock and currency markets on October 17, 1997), Hong Kong (large decline 
in stock market on October 17, 1997), Korea (managed float of won on November 17, 1997), and Japan 
(stock market crash on December 19, 1997). Their respective breakpoints are also used, but the results are 
similar.  
11 There are (1+8)*8/2=36 pair-wise correlations with 5 correlation decreases in the case of Malaysia. 
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Engle (2002).12 This GARCH-DCC model resolves the problem raised by F-R in that the 
conditional correlation estimated is also that of the standardized residuals. Since the 
standardized residuals account for the effect of the conditional variance, it alleviates the 
heteroskedasticity problem to a large extent. In addition, the model avoids the 
endogeneity problem by using the U.S. stock return as an exogenous global factor in the 
mean equation rather than using the source of contagion (e.g. stock return in Thailand) as 
an independent variable. Another advantage of this model is its parsimonious parameter 
setting. As you can see later, this chapter derives 45 pair-wise correlation coefficient 
series in a single estimation and it illustrates how the correlations between asset returns 
change over time, especially during the Asian crisis, and allows us to examine whether 
the correlation coefficients have increased during the Asian crisis and other events.  
The model used in this chapter can be written as: 
Mean Equations:       (2.2) t
US
ttt RRR εγγγ +++= −− 12110
where , )',,,( ,10,2,1 tttt RRRR L= )',,,( ,10,2,1 tttt εεεε L= , ),0(~| 1 ttt HNI −ε . 
Since the US stock return has often been used as a global factor in the literature, I include 
1-day lagged US stock return in addition to the AR(1) term in the mean equations of the 
other nine countries to account for the common shock.13 
                                                 
12 Another type of multivariate GARCH model with constant conditional correlation (CCC) is also used to 
estimate the correlation coefficients by splitting the sample using July 2, 1997 as breakpoint. The results are 
very similar to those in unconditional correlation analysis. In 34 pair-wise correlation increases, 30 are 
significant before the correction for heteroskedasticity and 20 are still significant after the correction.  
13 Neither exchange rate changes nor interest rate changes are included in the mean equations. During the 
crisis, exchange rates fluctuated a lot more than stock prices. Later in this study, it is shown that exchange rate 
changes can only explain a very small portion of stock market changes during the crisis. In addition, the 
interest rates data of these Asian countries do not have a consistent measurement and reflect government 
intervention via monetary policy, which makes it inappropriate to include interest rates changes in this high-
frequency data study. As Baig and Goldfajn (1998) argue, overnight call rates were widely used as tools of 
monetary policy so that they reflect more about the policy stance rather than the market determined levels.  
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is the conditional correlation matrix of the residuals or standardized residuals and , 
, …,  are the variance equations for the ten stock returns. Expanding the 
variance-covariance matrices into individual equations will get:  
th ,11
t, th ,10,10
2
1,1,, −− ++= tiitiiiitii bhach ε    i=1, 2, …, 10      (2.4) 
tjjtiitijtij hhh ,,,, ρ=      i, j = 1, 2, …, 10 and i≠j     (2.5) 
tjjtiitijtij qqq ,,,, /=ρ     i, j = 1, 2, …, 10 and i≠j     (2.6) 
where the conditional covariance q between the standardized residuals tij , ti,η  and tj ,η  can 
be expressed in the following two ways. The first is the mean reverting approach, which 
is given by: 
1,1,1,, )1( −−− ++−−= tjtitijijtij qq ηβηαβαρ  i, j = 1, 2, …, 10 and i≠j  (2.7) 
with tjjtjtjtiititi hh ,,,,,, /,/ εηεη == , and ijρ  as the unconditional correlation between 
t,1ε  and t,2ε . The average of q  will be tij , ijρ  and the average variance will be 1. The 
above expression is mean reverting model when 1<+ βα . An alternative specification 
is the integrated model through exponential smoothing: 1,1,1,)1( −−− +, −= tijtjti qtijq ληηλ . 
This study focuses on the first specification because DCC model with mean-
reverting process for conditional covariance of the standardized residual performs best 
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among other methods (see the simulation results in Engle, 2002). Another advantage over 
other types of multivariate models, such as full vec model and BEKK model (Engle and 
Kroner, 1995) is that this model can easily be expanded to model N asset returns.  
The estimation of the DCC model can be done by a two-step approach to 
maximizing the log likelihood function as:  
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Since the first part of the likelihood function is not related to the correlation coefficient 
and it is simply the sum of individual GARCH likelihoods, it can be maximized in the 
first step over the parameters in D  and then in the second step the correlation 
coefficients can be estimated given the parameters estimated in the first step.  
t
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
In order to show the power of this model, I will try to estimate as many 
correlation coefficients as possible in one single estimation, in this case, (1+9)*9/2=45 
pair-wise correlation coefficients because there are 10 countries here.14 Then this chapter 
focuses the analysis of correlation changes on two specific groups. The first group is the 
hardest-hit group, including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea. 
The objective is to see whether there is correlation increase during the crisis. The second 
                                                 
 
14 The contemporary correlation coefficients between the US stock return and the other Asian stock returns 
may not have any practical meaning due to time zone difference. The Asian stock returns in day t is 
expected to be most affected by the US stock return in day t-1. 
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group includes Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Japan to examine the different 
timing and magnitude of the contagion from the emerging markets to Japan. 
Table 2.3 shows coefficients of the mean equations and variance equations. The 
AR (1) term in the mean equation is significantly positive for Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore, while significantly negative for Hong Kong and 
Japan. However, it is not significant for Korea, Taiwan, and the US. The effect of the US 
stock return on the Asian stock returns is on average quite significant and consistent, 
ranging from 0.155 (Indonesia) to 0.474 (Hong Kong).15 The variance equation for each 
country shows significant coefficients for past volatility and shocks. It can be seen that 
volatility is highly persistent in all countries.  
 
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
 
2.5.1 Empirical Results of Correlations for the Hardest-hit Group 
 Since there are 45 correlation coefficients derived from the GARCH-DCC model, 
this section mainly looks at the correlation coefficients between the stock returns of 
Thailand and those of the other four hardest-hit countries during the Asian crisis. The 
objective here is trying to see whether there is contagion effect from Thailand to 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea. 16 
 
 
                                                 
 
15 These results are consistent with the findings by Chiang, Jeon & Oh (1996).  
16 However, correlation coefficients can only illustrate contemporary relationship, therefore the direction of 
contagion effects here is only inferred from the sequence of the attack of the crisis countries.  
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2.5.1.1 Two Phases of the Crisis 
Figure 2.2a shows the derived conditional correlation series between the stock 
returns of Thailand and those of Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, and the Philippines for the 
whole period. Figure 2.2b magnifies the crisis period and Figure 2.2c shows all the pair-
wise conditional correlation coefficients between the stock returns of these five hardest 
hit Asian countries from 1990 to 2003. The patterns are pretty similar to that in Figure 
2.2a. These figures show that the pair-wise conditional correlations increased during the 
second half of 1997 and reached a high level during 1998. Although all the five countries 
in the graph were hit hard, the stock return of Thailand showed very low correlation (as 
low as –0.05) with stock return of the other four countries during the early stage of the 
crisis. 17  However, during the whole period of 1998, the correlation became significantly 
higher and persisted at the highest level ranging from 0.3 to 0.4 and began to decline at 
the end of 1998.  
 
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here] 
 
One possible explanation is that this is evidence of contagion effects in stock 
markets in the region during the early phase of the crisis and herding behavior in the 
latter phase.18 Here contagion and herding behavior are distinguished in the sense that 
contagion describes the spread of shocks from one market to another with a significant 
increase in correlation between markets while herding describes the simultaneous 
                                                 
 
17 It should be noted that the low correlation during mid 1997 is not evidence against contagion effect. 
18 Several papers mention two different phases in the Asian crisis, e.g. Forbes (2000), Kallberg et al. (2002). 
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behavior of investors across different markets with high correlation coefficients in all 
markets. 19  When Thailand depreciated its currency, the investors still focused on 
Thailand, but not on other countries at the moment. Investors began to withdraw funds 
from Thailand and invest into other countries in the region. This resulted in the 
correlation decrease at the beginning of the crisis. As more and more countries fell out 
due to different transmission channels, investors began to panic and withdraw funds out 
of all the Asian economies.20 During this process, the stock returns in these economies 
showed gradually increasing correlation as a sign of financial market contagion.  
Given the prevailing increasing uncertainty in the markets, the cost of collecting 
credible information is relatively high during such period, and investors are likely to 
follow the other major investors to make their investing decisions. Any public news 
about one country may be interpreted as information regarding the entire region. That is 
why we see consistently high correlation during 1998, which is considered a result of 
herding behavior. Since I have daily data here, the division of the two phases has to be 
arbitrary to some extent. As observed, the second phase started when South Korea was 
hit and floated its currency won on November 17, 1997. Thereafter, news in any country 
would affect other countries, representing the most widespread panic.21  
 
 
                                                 
 
19 Herding is one phenomenon due to sudden shifts of investor sentiment or due to cross-market hedging.  
20 Kaminsky et al. (2000) indicate that bond and equity flows to Asia collapsed from their peak of 38 
billion US dollars in 1996 to 9 billion dollars in 1998. Particularly Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Korea experienced respectively 12.91%, 11.75%, 6.91%, 6.49% average net selling (as percentage of the 
end of the preceding quarter holdings) in the two quarters following the outbreak of the crisis.   
21 Applying the threshold cointegration model to daily exchange rates, spot and forward, Jeon and Seo 
(2003) identified the exact breakpoint at November 18th 1997 for the Korean won, and August 15th 1997 for 
the Thailand baht.  
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2.5.1.2 Statistical Analysis  
 As shown in Figures 2.2, the pair-wise conditional correlation coefficients between 
stock returns of these Asian countries were seen to be persistently higher and more 
volatile in the second phase of the crisis.  This leads to two important implications from 
the investor’s point of view.  First, a higher level of correlation implies that the benefit 
from market portfolio diversification becomes diminished.  Second, a higher volatility of 
the correlation coefficients suggests that the stability of the correlation is less reliable, 
generating more uncertainty.  For these reasons, tests are conducted to examine level shift 
and variance change on correlation coefficients.    
Using three dummy variables for different sub-samples, the dynamic feature of 
the correlation changes can be investigated.  The regression model is given by: 
tij
k
p
ptijp
q
tqqtij DM ,
1
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3
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,0, εραααρ +++= ∑∑
=
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      (2.8) 
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where tij ,ρ  is the pair-wise correlation coefficient between stock return of Thailand and 
those of the other four crisis countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, and the Philippines. 
 is the dummy variable for the first phase of the crisis period (7/2/1997-
11/17/1997);  is the dummy variable for the second phase of the Asian crisis 
(11/18/1997-12/31/1998);  is the dummy variable for the post-crisis period 
(1/1/1999-3/21/2003). Since our pre-tests using ARCH-LM statistics find significant 
tDM ,1
tDM ,2
tDM ,3
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heteroskedasticity in all cases,22 a GARCH(1,1) model with three dummy variables DM1, 
DM2, and DM3 in variance equation is added to the system:   
tq
q
qtijtijtij DMhh ,
3
1
2
2
,21,10, ∑
=
+− +++= βεβββ       (2.9) 
The lag length of k is determined by the AIC criterion. As the model stands, if the 
dummy variable is significantly different from zero, for example, DM1 is significant and 
positive in equation (2.8), that means during the first phase of the crisis, the correlation 
coefficient is on average higher than that in the pre-crisis period. 
 The model is estimated by using the maximum likelihood method. Table 2.4 
reports the estimated results for the GARCH(1,1) model.  The evidence shows that none 
of DM1 in the mean equations is statistically significant, indicating that the correlation 
during the early phase of the crisis is not different from that during the pre-crisis period.  
This may be attributable to a dramatic drop of the correlation coefficients in the first 
phase of the crisis period when contagion effect was not fully spread.  However, all of 
DM2 in the mean equations are statistically significant and positive, suggesting a notable increase 
in correlation during the second phase of the crisis compared to that of the pre-crisis period.  This 
also signifies the existence of contagion process between the two sub-periods.  Obviously, this 
contagious effect negates the benefit from holding a diversified international portfolio.  
After the crisis, the correlation coefficients decreased significantly in all cases except Korea. As 
expected, the investors became more rational in analyzing the individual market’s 
fundamentals rather than herding after others.  Thus, the correlation between market 
returns went down.  The high correlation between stock returns of Thailand and Korea 
                                                 
 
22 LM tests are used for ARCH effect tests and results are available upon request.   
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after the crisis is consistent with the wake-up call hypothesis, where investors realize 
some similarity between the two markets’ fundamentals after the crisis.  Therefore, their 
trading strategy will be based on the related information in both markets.  Meanwhile, the 
volatility of the correlation coefficients also increased due to the crisis in both the first 
phase and the second phase of the crisis. And this increase in volatility is permanent, 
shown from higher volatility in the post-crisis period. This evidence suggests that during 
the crisis, the correlation coefficient could vary greatly so that the estimates and 
statistical inference of the risk from risk models based on constant correlation coefficient 
can be very misleading.  
 
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
 
2.5.1.3 Comparison with Other Events and with Exchange Rates Behavior  
The results in Figure 2.2 also allow us to examine other events during the 1990s. 
For example, during the Gulf war in 1990 and 1991, the correlations increased almost 
two times. During 1994 and 1995 the correlations coefficients also increased greatly, 
which might be due to the end of dual exchange rate system in China and the Mexico 
crisis. However, none of these events are as significant as the Asian crisis  
In order to compare the behavior of the stock markets with that of the currency 
markets, I also show the pair-wise conditional correlation of the exchange rates between 
the crisis countries. Corresponding to Figure 2.2a and Figure 2.2b, Figure 2.3a and 
Figure 2.3b show the conditional correlation of the baht with the other four currencies. 
Compared with the stock markets, the currency markets had less activity and did not 
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show a significant increase in correlation during 1997 and 1998. So the contagion effect 
in terms of correlation coefficients is not very strong, although the correlations did 
fluctuate more than before with similar patterns across countries. From this comparison, 
we can see that part of the fluctuations in the stock markets might come from the 
currency markets, but not all of them. The stock markets may process more information, 
such as the IMF programs, sovereign rating changes, and corporate news, while the 
currency markets had more government intervention. This again verifies that the stock 
markets are more important transmission channels than the currency markets. 
 
[Insert Figure 2.3 about here] 
 
2.5.2 Empirical Results of Correlations for the Group including Japan 
The estimation results from the DCC model also help us to examine the possible 
existence of contagion effect between Japan and the crisis countries. In order to give a 
clear picture, I only include, in addition to Japan, four more important crisis countries, i.e. 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea. Figure 2.4a and Figure 2.4b show the 
correlation between the stock return of Japan and those of the other four during the whole 
sample and during the crisis. In Figure 2.4a, the Asian crisis is not as dramatic an event 
when compared to the effect of the 1990 Gulf War and the 2001 September 11 attack. 
The correlation coefficients generally remain low at around 0.15. However, during late 
1997, only the stock returns of Malaysia and Japan had a high correlation of 0.20 for a 
short period (see Figure 2.4b). During early 1998, the correlation coefficients rose 
gradually. They reached a high of around 0.25 during September and October of 1998, 
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when the U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) almost collapsed in 
September 1998. This is consistent with the findings in Arestis et al. (2003) that 
contagion from the Asian crisis countries to Japan took place in early 1998. While the 
contagion from the Asian crisis countries to Japan was quite slow and moderate, the 
effect of other events or factors might be more dramatic, which can be seen with high 
correlation coefficients of almost 0.4 during early 1990s and 2000s.  
 
[Insert Figure 2.4 about here] 
 
2.6 VAR Analysis 
Since correlation analysis is studying the contemporary comovement of the stock 
returns, in this section I will examine the short-run dynamics of the stock returns during 
different sub-periods of the Asian crisis to see if transmission channels and source of 
contagion might change during the crisis. The fact that correlation only increased 
gradually from several months after July 2, 1997 inspires this study. The analysis in this 
section alleviates part of the problems with correlation analysis by using a more dynamic 
VAR system and a variance decomposition analysis.  
 
2.6.1 Pre-tests for Data 
Before I go on to the short-run analysis, whether these stock prices are 
cointegrated or not, i.e. whether they have long run relationships, should be examined.23 
                                                 
 
23 ADF and PP tests show that all stock prices (in natural logs) are nonstationary at 1% significance level 
and all stock returns (first differences of log stock prices) are stationary. Results are available upon request. 
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If they do, then the traditional Vector Auto-regressive (VAR) analysis will be 
misspecified and error correction terms from the cointegration should be incorporated to 
represent the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. Since the hardest hit countries 
include Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea, 24 and Hong Kong played an important 
role in the second phase of the crisis, the study in this section will only focus on these 
five. Too many variables will prevent us from observing the whole picture clearly.  
As to the cointegration technique, I follow Sephton and Larsen (1991) iterated 
Johansen cointegration test25 to examine the time-varying cointegrating relationships. 
The first Johansen test is based on the first 80 daily observations and then I add 20 
observations each time to see how the test statistics change over time. The specification 
of the test I use here is that there is no deterministic trend in the data while there is an 
intercept but no trend in the cointegrating equation. I also tried other specifications of 
cointegration tests and the results are quite similar. The nonstandard critical values are 
taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992), which differ slightly from those reported in 
Johansen and Juselius (1990). Figure 2.5a and 2.5b illustrate these test statistics over time. 
Generally there is no cointegrating relationship among the five countries in our sample. 26 
There are a few times that one cointegrating relationship existed. However, these few 
exceptions are not robust results. Therefore for the rest of this section, I will assume no 
cointegrating relationship among the five stock price indices.  
                                                 
 
24 The Philippines is not included here when it was added to the VAR, its role was minimal.  
25  Sephton and Larsen (1991) argue that the tests of exchange market efficiency using cointegration are 
sensitive to model specification and sample period selection.  
26 Sheng and Tu (2000) find cointegration relationship among ASEAN and NIE countries respectively 
because of their sample period selection. They choose one year before the crisis as pre-crisis period and 
one year after the breakout of the crisis as post-crisis period. Since cointegration analysis is a long run 
analysis, one year sample period may be too short. 
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[Insert Figure 2.5 about here] 
 
2.6.2 VAR and Variance Decomposition Analysis 
A five-variable VAR system is established now to investigate how the shocks 
from one market were transmitted to other markets. The whole sample period is divided 
into four: the pre-crisis period (January 1, 1990 – July 1, 1997), the first-phase of the 
crisis period (July 2, 1997 – November 16, 1997), the second phase of the crisis period 
(November 17, 1997 – December 31, 1998), and the post-crisis period (January 1, 1999 - 
March 21, 2003). At most one or two lags should be included for efficient markets where 
stock prices adjust quickly to all relevant information. The lag exclusion Wald test shows 
that lag two is only significant for Malaysia at 5% significance level. So a 1-day lag is 
chosen for this VAR.  
In a VAR system, variance decomposition analysis can separate the variation in 
an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the VAR. By dividing the sample 
into different sample periods, it can be seen which markets’ shocks affect other markets 
most. Table 2.5a-d show the results of variance decomposition from the VAR models. 
Notice that the standard error increases significantly during the first phase and second 
phase of the crisis and goes back to its pre-crisis level for all countries but South Korea. I 
also want to look at the compositions of the variance during different periods. For 
example, Korea accounts for almost 98% of its own variance in the pre-crisis period after 
10 days, for only about 86% during the first-phase of the crisis, for about 87% during the 
second-phase of the crisis, and for about 72% during the post-crisis period. During the 
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first phase of the crisis, it seems that Malaysia and Hong Kong account for more variance 
in Korea.27 During the second phase, however, Thailand took the lead, accounting for 
about 11% of Korea’s variance. These findings are consistent with the analysis of Figure 
2.2c. Although there was an increase in correlation between Thailand and Korea stock 
returns, the correlation only reached the peak later in 1998. However, the relationship 
between Malaysia and Korea stock returns reached its highest point much earlier, at the 
end of 1997. Korea’s relationships with Indonesia and the Philippines seem to be 
relatively weak and increase relatively late during the crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
 
The source of contagion might be different depending on the sample period and 
specific market. But generally speaking, Malaysia played a very important role in 
transmitting shocks during the first phase of the crisis. As seen in Table 2.1b, among 
those earliest-hit countries, Malaysia had the largest market capitalization and was the 
most actively traded.28 Malaysia’s influence diminished during the latter phase of the 
crisis due to its adoption of capital control. A surprising result is that Thailand was the 
most influential during the second phase of the crisis, even in other countries’ cases. 
However, the role of Thailand in the second phase might be that either Thailand was the 
source of contagion or the ordering of the VAR is misspecified. I tried an alternative 
                                                 
 
27 Malaysia and Korea both export electronics. On the other hand, Hong Kong and Korea are both NIEs 
and have relatively open financial markets. 
28 Kallberg et al. (2002) show that Malaysia suffered the most significant outflows in the second half of 1997. 
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ordering, putting Hong Kong in the first place.29 The results are quite different with Hong 
Kong playing the most important role except in Korea case. Thailand was still more 
important in influencing Korea stock return. Since the results in variance decomposition 
are sensitive to the ordering of the variables, interpretation of these results should be 
cautious. 
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the relationship between the stock returns of the crisis-
struck countries, especially those hardest hit during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, using 
two different methodologies. The first emphasizes the estimation of contemporaneous 
correlation coefficients between stock returns, employing a multivariate GARCH model 
with dynamic conditional correlation. This model overcomes the heteroskedasticity and 
endogeneity problems in the traditional models and estimates the time-varying 
correlation series. Dynamics of the correlation series are then investigated, especially 
during the Asian crisis. It is found that after accounting for heteroskedasticity and 
endogeneity issues properly, there is evidence of contagion effects during the Asian crisis, 
in contrast with the “no contagion” conclusion in Forbes and Rigobon (2002). In addition, 
two phases of the crisis dynamics can be identified. In the first phase, there were significant 
increases in the correlation coefficients, while in the second phase the correlations 
remained high.  One possible explanation is that the contagion effect took place early 
during the crisis and herding behavior dominated later on. The examination of Japan’s case 
                                                 
 
29 Results for this ordering are not reported, but available upon request. 
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indicates that the contagion from the crisis countries to Japan is slower and smaller 
compared to the contagion among the Southeast Asian countries.  
The second methodology complements the first one in that the VAR models 
investigate the dynamic short-run relationships among the stock returns. Using variance 
decomposition, it is found that Malaysia played an important role in transmitting shocks 
to other countries during the early stage of the crisis due to its more developed stock 
market, while Thailand and Hong Kong were affecting other countries the most during 
the second phase of the crisis.  
The finding of at least some contagion during the crisis justifies the involvement 
of international institutions such as IMF to bail out countries that suffered from financial 
contagion. It also reduces the benefits of international diversification during the crisis 
periods and undermines the accuracy of risk management models.  
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Chapter 3. The Impact of Sovereign Rating Changes on Stock Market and Financial 
Contagion – The Case of Five Asian Countries 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The rapid spread of the 1997 Asian financial crisis within the region’s five 
countries, namely Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea, has been 
partly attributed to the inappropriate measures of the international agencies, such as IMF, 
credit rating agencies, and large mutual fund managers. Before the occurrence of the 
crisis, none of these agencies had been able to foresee the impending event. For example, 
OECD accepted Korea as a member in October 1996 with the condition to open its 
capital account transactions, which later expedited the fall out of Korea. One of the 
largest credit rating agencies, DCR (Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co.) upgraded the 
foreign currency rating of the Philippines from “BB-” to “BB+” on June 30th 1997, right 
before the crisis of Thailand. Another credit rating agency, Standard & Poor’s, 
maintained high ratings (“A” band category) for these five Asian countries before the 
crisis. Some argue that the high ratings given by these international rating agencies 
before the crisis played an important role in inducing large flows of funds into the 
emerging markets in Asia. Even after the Thailand crisis began, the seriousness of the 
crisis had not been recognized soon enough. The IMF Report published on September 
17th 1997 wrote: “There are reasons to believe that currency turbulence will eventually 
wane without greatly damaging the region.”  
 However, as the crisis deepened, these agencies took some measures that are 
blamed by many to aggravate the crisis. IMF’s bailout packages were blamed to adopt 
stringent monetary and fiscal policies, which might be effective for long-term 
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management, but deepened the banking sector problems and crushed investors’ 
confidence during the crisis. Even worse, the credit rating agencies largely (by several 
notches) downgraded the ratings of the crisis countries, which further reversed the 
expectations of the market participants and strengthened the financial turbulence during 
the last quarter of 1997. The largest downgrading of the foreign currency rating was that 
of Korea from a high of “AA-” before October 24th 1997 to junk grade “B+” at the end of 
1997. The downgrade of long-term sovereign foreign currency rating to “B+” on 
December 22nd 1997 and the downgrades of best-known firms in Korea, such as 
Samsung Electronics Co., Hyundai Motor Co. and Daewoo Corp. on the next day were 
said to reflect the deepening pessimism and blow out the international effort to bolster 
confidence in Korea and might force pension funds and other investors to sell some of 
their holdings (December 23rd 1997, Wall Street Journal Eastern edition). 
Some argue that these credit rating agencies, instead of giving warnings to 
investors before hand, are pro-cyclical, which means they upgrade the ratings in a 
booming market and downgrade the ratings in a slump market. They aggravated the crisis 
by giving no new information and at the same time misgiving the signals regarding the 
true positions of other neighboring countries, for which no such information was known 
at the moment and whose economic health are robust. Herding of the investors, thus, 
resulted after such downgrade announcements. 
This argument is consistent with that in Calvo and Mendoza (2000). They argue 
that there is fixed cost of gathering and processing country-specific information and, 
under certain assumptions, the utility gain of paying this cost falls as the number of 
countries invested in increases. As the financial markets become more globalized, fund 
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managers tend to speculate information in one country from information in another 
similar country. This information cost becomes extremely high during the crisis so that 
cross-market hedging and contagion occurs when fund managers sell assets in all markets 
in that region.  
 Due to these observations, this chapter is trying to answer the following questions: 
Did the rating changes during the crisis help the financial market recovery or worsen the 
situation? Did the rating changes in one country affect the financial markets in other 
crisis countries? Which rating changes were more contagious, the downgrades or the 
upgrades? This chapter combines the sovereign rating literature with the contagion 
literature and explores the role of sovereign rating changes in the context of stock market 
contagion during the Asian crisis.  
 Generally speaking, the stock markets respond to rating changes in their own 
countries. However, during the crisis, the responses to their own downgrades are not 
significant probably due to the expectations from the markets. Therefore, the downgrades 
during the crisis did not seem to worsen the financial situation. As to contagion effects, 
rating changes in one country affect the stock markets in other crisis countries. However, 
a large part of this contagion effect comes from the upgrades during the crisis and 
downgrades during the whole period. The rating upgrades in Korea boost the investor 
confidence in all the stock markets during the crisis and help the recovery of the financial 
markets. But the impact of downgrades on other markets during the crisis does not show 
much difference from that in other periods.   
 The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 is a brief literature 
review on the impact of sovereign credit ratings on financial asset returns. Section 3.3 
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describes the data and Section 3.4 shows two methodologies used. Section 3.5 presents 
the empirical results and Section 3.6 summarizes the findings. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 The Impact of Corporate Bond Rating Changes 
There has been some event study literature on how corporate rating changes can 
affect the bond prices and stock prices of the firms (see Hand et al., 1992; Goh and 
Ederington, 1993). There are two key findings in this literature. In general, ratings 
upgrades have no impact on the bond and stock markets. For rating downgrades, there is 
a significant negative market response. However, there are also some other documented 
results. For example, the market may not respond to rating downgrades because many 
follow news of an increase in the firm’s riskiness so that the downgrade has already been 
anticipated (see Goh and Ederington, 1993; McCarthy and Melicher, 1988). In addition, 
the impact of downgrades may spread to other stocks belonging to the same industry (see 
Akhigbe and Madura, 1997).  
These results in corporate finance are relevant to this study because it was 
observed that the impact of sovereign rating downgrades spread to other neighboring 
countries and affected the stock markets in those countries. Like other credit ratings, 
sovereign ratings are assessments of the relative likelihood that a borrower will default 
on its obligations. They are important, however, because these ratings affect the ratings 
assigned to borrowers of the same nationality and determine the ability to borrow for 
both countries and companies. During the Asian crisis, the downgrades of the crisis 
countries’ sovereign ratings greatly affected their companies’ ability to borrow or 
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rollover old debts in international capital markets. The main objective here is to examine 
the financial contagion through the sovereign credit rating changes during the crisis. 
Although the studies on corporate rating changes have been somewhat abundant and 
started in late 1980s, the study on sovereign rating changes started only after the Mexican 
crisis and especially after the Asian crisis. One reason might be the blame on the rating 
agencies during the crisis and another might be the lack of data because the sovereign 
rating assignments and changes have grown rapidly after 1990s.  
 
3.2.2 The Impact of Sovereign Credit Rating Changes on Sovereign Bond Spreads 
There have been several studies on the impact of sovereign credit rating changes 
on sovereign bond spreads. Cantor and Packer (1996) is the first to systematically 
analyze the determinants of the sovereign credit ratings and its impact on sovereign bond 
spreads. Using cross-sectional OLS regression, they find that six criteria play an 
important role in determining a country’s rating. It is also shown that sovereign ratings 
effectively summarize information contained in macroeconomic indicators and may 
contain information not available in public sources. Their event study, using all 
announcements between 1987 and 1994, concludes that the announcement of sovereign 
rating changes affect bond yield significantly.  
Larrain et al. (1997) employ a yearly panel Granger-causality test to see whether 
the two major rating agencies lead or lag market events. The results show that dollar 
bond spreads and a set of default determinants seem to explain somewhat better the level 
of sovereign ratings rather than vice versa. Their event study shows that for the full 
sample, the impact of rating announcements is only significant for emerging markets, but 
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not for developed markets. After dividing the rating announcements into different 
categories, they only find highly significant short-run announcement effect when 
emerging market sovereign bonds are put on review with negative outlook. Reisen and 
von Maltzan (1999) extend the study to a longer period and more agencies. They use a 
monthly bivariate Granger-causality test and find two-way causality between rating 
changes and spreads changes. The event study shows a significant impact of imminent 
upgrades and actual downgrades from all three agencies on relative sovereign bond yield 
spreads.  
Kraussl (2000) further adds a third variable to the bivariate VAR system - total 
foreign assets as a proxy for international liquidity. His objective of examining the 
impact of unexpected rating changes on the spreads and the international liquidity 
respectively leads to the use of decomposition technique in the VAR system. The case 
study of Korea shows that the unexpected rating downgrades had little impact on the 
liquidity, therefore implying that sovereign downgrades do not necessarily intensify the 
financial crises.  
 
3.2.3 The Impact of Sovereign Credit Rating Changes on the Stock Returns 
None of the above-mentioned papers focuses on the impact of sovereign rating 
changes on stock markets. Only recently two papers study this issue. Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002), using rating changes assigned by three major rating agencies from 16 
emerging markets from 1990 to 2000, test the spillover effects across securities and 
countries, namely the impact of sovereign rating changes on stock returns and the 
contagion effect from one country’s sovereign rating changes to another country’s 
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sovereign bond and stock markets. Their panel regression analysis shows that rating 
changes of bonds in one emerging market trigger changes in both yield spreads and stock 
returns in other emerging economies, confirming the contagion hypothesis. They also 
find that changes in credit ratings and outlooks have a stronger effect on both domestic 
markets and foreign markets during crises. Event study confirms that rating agencies are 
pro-cyclical and provide bad news in bad times and good news in good times. Brooks et 
al. (2003) only use event study to examine the impact of downgrades and upgrades on 
national stock market indices. They find that only downgrades convey information to the 
market. Among the four rating agencies examined, only downgrades by Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch result in significant market falls. No differences are found between the 
sensitivity to rating changes in emerging markets and non-emerging markets. 
Since only Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) examine the contagion effect, this 
study will basically follow their methodology. However, their paper does not examine 
the different impacts of downgrades and upgrades during the crisis. It does not 
distinguish the impacts of rating changes in different time periods. In addition, in their 
panel estimation, only the contemporaneous relationship between rating changes and 
stock return changes is examined and there is no country specific study.  
This chapter studies the impact of sovereign credit rating changes on the national 
stock indices during the 1997 Asian crisis to fill in these gaps. The focus on the Asian 
crisis is due to the multiple significant downgrades during the crisis and a large amount 
of critiques on the downgrades afterwards. As we observed during the crisis, large 
downgrades of sovereign ratings of crisis countries seemed to aggravate the situation. 
One hypothesis here is that downgrades during the crisis worsened the stock markets in 
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the crisis countries. The distinction between downgrades and upgrades is emphasized 
because in the corporate bond rating literature, generally downgrades have a significant 
impact while upgrades don’t. Second, this chapter examines the different responses to 
rating changes during the crisis period versus during the tranquil period. It is expected 
that the downgrades during the crisis have a larger impact on the stock returns. Third, this 
study also improves the methodologies by using dynamic panel estimation and a more 
rigorous event study. 
There are several reasons that sovereign credit rating changes will affect the 
national stock returns. One might be that sovereign rating downgrades limit the ability of 
all units within that country to borrow in the international capital markets and increase 
their borrowing costs. Since most of the companies that borrow abroad are large 
companies, which are included in the composite stock index, the high borrowing cost of 
those companies may be reflected in the companies’ stock prices and therefore the 
national stock index. This is especially the case during the crisis when the rollover of old 
debts is critical for the survival of firms and banks and the stock prices drop dramatically 
when companies cannot borrow in favorable terms or lose the ability to borrow if the 
sovereign rating is below investment grade. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) also argue 
that governments may raise taxes on firms to neutralize the adverse budget effect of 
higher interest rates on government bonds triggered by the downgrades, thus affecting the 
stock market returns. As to the contagion effect during the crisis, the rating changes may 
act as a wake-up call, which hypothesizes that information in one country may trigger 
turbulence in other countries due to similarity between them. Another line of reasoning 
from Brooks et al. (2003) emphasizes that sovereign rating changes may reveal important 
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information about country risk, which is critical for international portfolio management. 
A number of mutual funds offer country index portfolios. When such information about 
fundamentals is known, the fund managers will probably change the weightings of the 
index in their portfolios. This is known as the cross-market hedging channel.  
 
3.3 Data 
Unlike previous studies, this study only focuses on foreign currency rating 
changes for five Asian crisis countries from Standard & Poor’s. There are several reasons: 
first, local currency ratings started much later than foreign currency ratings and almost all 
the changes of both ratings happened at the same time. Therefore including of both does 
not have any additional meaning. Second, during the crisis, other rating agencies, such as 
Moodys, Fitch IBCA, and Thomson, downgraded or upgraded the countries around the 
same time. Brooks et al. (2003) also find that Standard & Poor’s have the greatest impact 
on market returns when announcing a rating downgrade. In order to minimize the 
repetitive information content, only Standard & Poor’s rating changes are included here. 
Third, this study is going to focus only on five hardest hit crisis countries, namely 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea. Other affected economies such 
as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan are not included because their foreign 
currency sovereign ratings did not change much during the crisis.  
Long-term foreign currency ratings represent a country’s likelihood to default on 
foreign-currency denominated sovereign bonds. The rating scales of Standard & Poor’s 
ratings are as follows. The highest band is the “A” band, which has seven notches: AAA, 
AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-. The next band is the “B” level rating, which has nine notches: 
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BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-. The lowest band has six notches: CCC+, 
CCC, CCC-, CC, SD (selective default) and D. Ratings above BB+ are considered 
investment grade while others are sub-investment grade. Cantor and Packer (1996) find 
that six factors are important criteria to determine the ratings: per capita income, GDP 
growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development and default history. 
Outlook changes are also included here because they may have the same information 
content as rating changes. There are three outlook scales: positive, stable, and negative. 
The sovereign rating changes between January 1st 1990 and March 21st 2003 are obtained 
from Standard & Poor’s Creditweek. Summary of the ratings are reported in Table 3.1. 
Reported also is the summary during the two sub-periods. The crisis period is defined as 
starting from July 2nd, 1997 when Thailand gave up defending its currency Baht and 
ending December 31st, 1998. The tranquil period is defined as periods other than the 
crisis period. The number of outlook changes is less than rating changes, largely due to 
the crisis period. There is an asymmetry between the two sub-periods, with most of the 
downgrades from the crisis period and a large portion of upgrades from tranquil period. 
 
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
 
In order to use these ratings, numerical values are attached to the ratings. Since 
there are a total of 22 notches where the lowest rating never shows up in the sample, the 
highest rating AAA is assigned 20 and the SD assigned 0. Negative outlook will add 
nothing to the value, while stable and positive outlooks add 1/3 and 2/3 to the rating 
values respectively. If there is an upgrade or a downgrade by one notch, then the rating is 
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changed by +1 or -1.  If there is an outlook change from positive to stable or from stable 
to negative, then the rating is changed by –1/3.  
Daily stock market indices from Datastream International are obtained for the five 
countries during the period January 1st, 1990 to March 21st, 2003. They are Bangkok 
S.E.T. Index, Jakarta SE Composite Index, Kuala Lumpur SE Index, Philippines SE 
Composite Index, and Korea SE Composite Index for Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Korea respectively. S&P 500 index is included as a global factor in 
affecting the stock markets in the world. MSCI Asia-Pacific Market Index excluding 
Japan is used in the event study as the market portfolio. The stock returns are calculated 
as log differences of stock indices and expressed in percentages.  
To give you a basic idea of how the rating changes affect the stock indices, Figure 
3.1 plots the pattern of stock indices and rating levels for these five countries. The rating 
changes are very consistent with the patterns in stock indices changes, although the 
former cannot fully explain the latter. Before the crisis, the rating rankings from the 
highest to the lowest are Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The 
ratings for Philippines did not seem to change that much during the crisis, while Korea 
suffered the most from the series of downgrades and the magnitude of that is the largest 
among the five.  
 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
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3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Panel Regressions 30 
 In order to see whether the downgrades worsened the financial turbulence during 
the crisis, the following dynamic panel regression is established:  
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ti RRRR 4,93,82,71,6 ++++ ∆+∆+∆+∆+ γγγγ             (3.1) 
where , , and ∆ represent the stock return in country i, the stock return in 
the U.S., and rating changes in its own country (O) respectively. One-day lag for the 
dependent variable is included to account for the autocorrelation of the series. One-day 
lag for the US return is employed to represent the global business cycle and considered 
exogenous in this case. Four-day lags and leads of own-country rating changes are 
included to show whether these ratings give investors information before hand or they are 
pro-cyclical.
tiS ,∆ tUSS ,∆ OtiR ,
31  The coefficients on own rating changes are expected to be positive 
because when there is an upgrade (or a downgrade), the stock return should be positive 
(or negative). If the ratings are pro-cyclical, it is expected that the lead variables of own 
rating changes have significant coefficients. If not, then the lag variables should have 
significant coefficients. 
Contagion effects are examined using the following panel OLS estimation: 
O
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titUStiti RRRRRSSS 4,53,42,31,2,11,21,10, −−−−−− ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆ γγγγγβββ  
                                                 
 
30 Note that the number of rating changes is rather small, especially during sub-periods and for country-
specific studies. So the statistical power of these regressions may not be very strong. 
31 Macroeconomic fundamentals are not included because rating changes have summarized information in 
them (see Cantor and Packer, 1996). 
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where  represents rating changes in other foreign countries (F). The coefficients on 
foreign rating changes measure the contagion effect and are expected to be significantly 
positive during the crisis.  
F
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Then the different roles of downgrades and upgrades are examined by estimating 
the following equation:32 
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where , ,  and  represent the upgrades in own country, 
downgrades in own country, upgrades in other countries, and downgrades in other 
countries respectively. If the downgrades aggravated the crisis, then one of the 
coefficients 
OU
tiR ,∆ ODtiR ,∆ FUtiR ,∆ FDtiR ,∆
4θ , 5θ , and 6θ would be significantly positive when this equation is 
estimated during the crisis. 
Each of these panel regressions is estimated for both the whole sample and two 
sub-periods to detect any differences between the crisis period and the tranquil period. 
Since these five countries might respond differently to the rating changes, time series 
analysis for each of them is also conducted using the same equations. For Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, equation (3) will not have ∆  during the OUtiR ,
                                                 
 
32 Results from equation (3.1) and (3.2) do not show interesting results for longer lags, therefore only 1-day 
lag and lead variables are used in equation (3.3). 
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crisis because the only two upgrades come from Korea. However, the number of rating 
changes is rather small in some of the cases. 
 
3.4.2 Event Study Methodology 
 Since the panel regressions are limited by the small number of rating changes, 
standard event study is further employed to detect abnormal returns resulting from rating 
changes announcements. First, by using only own-country rating changes, the issue of 
pro-cyclical rating changes is addressed. Second, by using foreign-country rating changes, 
contagion effects during the crisis are studied. Third, focusing on the own-country and 
foreign-country downgrades during the crisis, the role of downgrades is examined. Event 
studies can also help to look into longer period impacts of rating changes.  
 The calculation and test of abnormal returns is pretty standard. The abnormal 
returns are calculated as daily raw returns adjusted by daily Morgan Stanley Asian-
Pacific stock market composite index excluding Japan (MSAFXJL). As presented in the 
previous section, 67 sovereign rating or outlook changes for 5 countries are used as event 
observations. The event dates are identified in Standard & Poor’s Credit Week. Setting 
the announcement dates as day 0, we examined the abnormal returns (ABR) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from day -1 to day +1.33 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
33 For various lengths of event windows, the announcement effect is most captured during these 3-day 
windows and the qualitative results of announcement effect didn’t change. 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Results from Panel Regressions 
The estimation results of equations (3.1) and (3.2) with panel data from all five 
countries are shown in Table 3.2. AR (1) terms are significant in all cases, indicating the 
existence of autocorrelation of stock returns. The coefficients on changes in the U.S. 
returns are all positive and significant, showing the strong effect from the U.S. Generally 
speaking, stock returns do respond to own country rating changes. Since the estimation 
from Equation (3.1) are very similar to that from Equation (3.2) and the latter contains 
more incremental variables, the analysis will focus on Equation (3.2). During the whole 
sample period, for rating upgrades (downgrades) of one notch, the stock return will 
increase (decrease) by 0.323% on the same day. The next day, the stock return will 
increase (decrease) by 0.399% with some mean-reverting behavior on the third and 
fourth day. Then, some mean-reverting behavior displays in the following days.  With 
respect to the impact of pro-cyclical rating changes, there is no evidence of supporting 
the null. 
 
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
 
By examining the data, as we anticipated, contagion effects show up in both 
entire periods and crisis periods, while there are no significant coefficients in the tranquil 
period. Interesting enough, our evidence shows a profound contagion effect in the crisis 
period. Specifically, for one notch rating changes in other countries, the stock return in 
the studied country will change by 0.560% within a 24-hour period, which is smaller than 
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impact of its own country’s rating changes. In addition, stock market returns respond to 
foreign country rating changes (0.560%) more quickly than to own country rating 
changes (0.356%). This indicates the strong and swift contagion effects during the crisis, 
when investors are more sensitively accessing the news development in a cross country 
environment. The stock market returns respond to own raring changes slowly at 0.815% 
on a following day.  Accordingly, the accumulated impact of own rating changes to stock 
market returns with a 48-hour period amounts to 1.171%, while that of foreign rating 
changes reaches 0.714%. 
To further investigate different roles of upgrades and downgrades, equation (3.3) 
is estimated and the results are reported in Table 3.3. In order to avoid over-
parameterizing and keep the parsimonious principle, we only include one-day lag and 
one-day lead for each rating variable. For the whole sample, the stock markets respond to 
both their own countries’ upgrades and downgrades, while responding only to 
downgrades to foreign countries.  The magnitude of downgrades is more profound than 
that of upgrades.  This finding is consistent with corporate bond rating literature, 
indicating asymmetrical effects between downgrades and upgrades. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
 
When equation (3.3) is estimated for the two sub-periods, the story is different. 
During the crisis period, Korea responds to its own upgrade by lagging one day. The lead 
variable is negative and significant, indicating that the upgrade of Korea during the crisis 
is not pro-cyclical. The response to foreign country upgrades shows that all four other 
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countries react strongly to Korea’s upgrades. Stock returns increase by 1.114% with 
respect to one notch upgrade. This indicates that the market was quite inspired by the 
good news and the upgrades might contain some information that investors did not know.  
Compared to results about upgrades, the downgrades do not seem to upset the 
markets during the crisis as expected. The markets are not affected by the news of 
downgrades in their own countries during the crisis. It seems that downgrades during the 
crisis did not worsen the turbulence as many blamed, compared to the tranquil period.34 
Possibly the market has interpreted other public news by the time of the sovereign rating 
downgrades. For example, before the downgrading of Thailand sovereign rating, there 
were already downgrading of many banking and finance companies. If this is the case, 
the downgrading of the sovereign should not be a surprise later. It is also possible that 
other agencies’ downgrading is several days before the downgrading by Standard & 
Poor’s. For example, Indonesia was downgraded by Fitch IBCA on January 8th 1998 
while downgraded by both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s on January 9th 1998. So the 
markets might have expected these two downgrades and already digested the information. 
The contagion effects from foreign country downgrades during the crisis are not different 
from that during the tranquil period. This indicates the existence of information 
asymmetry during the whole period and sovereign ratings contain information that 
foreign investors do not know. 
 
 
                                                 
 
34 As mentioned in the literature review, downgrades of the firm’s bond ratings may not have a significant 
impact on its stock because the markets already expect the downgrade. 
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3.5.2 Results from Country-specific Studies 
In country specific studies, the results for Thailand, Malaysia and Korea are 
shown in Tables 3.4 – 3.9 due to their uniqueness during the crisis period. In Thailand 
case, Table 3.4 shows that the stock market in Thailand responds more actively to its own 
rating changes and also foreign rating changes during the crisis, indicating strong 
contagion effects. However, this contagion effect might be different from the tranquil 
period due to the effect from upgrades during the crisis (see Table 3.5). This result is very 
similar to the panel estimation results. Thailand stock market seems to be affected by its 
own downgrades severely so that the downgrades in Thailand may have aggravated the 
financial turbulence. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
[Insert Table 3.5 about here] 
 
In Malaysia case, the stock market responds to own rating changes relatively 
slowly, lagging two days (see Table 3.6). However, it responds to foreign country rating 
changes very quickly, especially during the crisis period. It is also shown that the lead 
variables are significant, indicating some signs of pro-cyclical behavior of rating agencies. 
Table 3.7 shows that Malaysia responds more strongly to other countries’ downgrades 
during the crisis and this contagion effect lasts at least two days. Similar to Thailand, 
Malaysia also responds significantly to upgrades in Korea.  
 
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
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[Insert Table 3.7 about here] 
 
Korea was argued by many suffering the most from the contagion effect.  During 
the crisis period, Korea responds to its own upgrade by lagging one day. The lead 
variable is negative and significant, indicating that the upgrade of Korea during the crisis 
is not pro-cyclical. The response to foreign country upgrades shows that all four other 
countries react strongly to Korea’s upgrades. Surprisingly, no significant evidence to 
support that market responds to foreign countries’ rating changes during the crisis (see 
Tables 8 and 9).  Rather, Korea did show a significant response to its own downgrades, 
given that its own downgrades were dramatic and mostly announced in a short two-
month period.  Thus, similar to the case of Thailand, the downgrades worsened the crisis 
in Korea.  
 
[Insert Table 3.8 about here] 
[Insert Table 3.9 about here] 
 
3.5.3 Results from Event Studies   
In order to distinguish different impacts of upgrades and downgrades, the 
abnormal returns are calculated for upgrades and downgrades respectively. Similar to 
panel estimation, the whole sample period is divided into two sub-samples to see whether 
these upgrades and downgrades have different impacts during the crisis. The crisis period 
is from July 2, 1997 to December 31, 1998. The tranquil period is defined as all other 
dates.  
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To examine the contagion effect, the CAR of non-event stock market returns in 
this study is analyzed for the above event 67 events. Non-event observation is defined as 
the date when a specific country, out of 5 countries examined, does not have news, while 
there is some sovereign rating change news among the other 4 countries. Using this 
definition, 104 upgrade and 134 downgrade non-event observations are identified. 
 Table 3.10 reports the results of the event study. Panel A of the table shows the 
CARs of own upgrades and downgrades during the three sample periods. The CAR of 31 
upgrades for the whole period is positive (0.54%), but these figures are statistically 
insignificant. There were 2 upgrades for Korea during the crisis; the CAR was positive 
and large (3.91%). However, the downgrades seem to have a significantly negative 
impact on the own national stock markets, especially during the crisis period, compared 
to the tranquil period (whole period,–2.29%; crisis period -2.92%; tranquil period, -
1.17%).  
The Panel B of the same table shows the results of analysis on contagion effects.   
The panel B shows that the CARs of upgrade non-event observations are positive (whole 
period, 0.30%; crisis period, 6.19%; tranquil period -0.63%) as expected, but statistically 
insignificant except the crisis period. On the other hand, the CARs of downgrade non-
event observations are negative (whole period, -1.4%; crisis period, -2.15%; tranquil 
period, -0.21%), and statistically significant except the tranquil period.  Putting together, 
the upgrades or downgrades in one country did impact the stock markets in other crisis 
countries.  However, as we inspect the size of the coefficients, the evidence shows that 
the contagion effects of the upgrades were larger than those of the downgrades during the 
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crisis period, subject to the small sample bias due to the insufficient number of 
observations.  This is consistent with the findings in the panel estimation.  
 
[Insert Table 3.10 about here] 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 This study contributes to the literature by examining the unique role of credit 
rating agencies during the Asian crisis. The contagion effects resulting from foreign 
countries’ rating changes, either upgrades or downgrades, is also investigated. Findings 
from both panel regressions and country-specific studies are summarized as follows.   
First, the credit agencies do not show strong pro-cyclical behavior during the 
crisis period.  Second, the contagion effect from foreign countries’ rating changes  during 
the crisis is more prominent.  However, this result may be essentially due to the strong 
effects of upgrades. Third, during the crisis, all five countries show strong responses to 
other countries’ upgrades, indicating the importance of good news to market sentiment at 
bad times.  Fourth, during the crisis, the downgrades did not have a significant impact on 
their own stock markets, implying the prices were internalized into market expectations. 
Sixth, evidence derived from the country specific studies shows that both Thailand and 
Korea suffered severely from their own downgrades during the crisis, indicating the fact 
that sovereign rating changes worsen the crisis development in these two countries.   
In all the crisis-hit countries, the evidence consistently shows that the upgrades 
are contagious as well as the downgrades during the crisis.  However, the comparison of 
the size of the coefficients indicates that the contagion effects of the upgrades may be 
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larger than those of the downgrades.  The event study, which applies the market-adjusted-
return model to sovereign rating change announcements, confirms the major findings of the 
panel estimation on the contagion effects of the sovereign rating changes. 
This chapter provides evidence of financial contagion through the channel of 
sovereign rating changes. Therefore, investors should be aware that the diversification benefit 
from investing in these Asian stock portfolios was significantly reduced during the Asian 
crisis due to the contagion effect. Investment in portfolios in the emerging economies should 
consider the possible risks that might incur when the emerging economies are more subject 
to crises of this kind.  
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Chapter 4. Regime-Switching in Currency and Stock Markets 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 During the 1997 Asian crisis, financial shocks swept across countries and asset 
classes. The devaluation of the currencies in the crisis countries affected the rest of the 
economy, including the stock markets. There are two channels through which 
devaluation of a currency could affect these Asian economies.  
The first channel is through the real economy. In order for devaluation of a 
currency to provide a boost to the real sector, other currencies in competing countries 
need to keep their values, otherwise the fallacy of composition works. However, the 
advantage from the devaluation of a currency might not be substantial if the import 
content of major items of exports is large in the crisis countries.35 Moreover, a rational 
economic agent would expect a tighter monetary policy with a rise in domestic price as a 
result of the devaluation and therefore dampening of economic activity (Rakshit, 2002). 
The data of current account balance as a percentage of GDP in Table 4.1 Panel A 
supports this viewpoint. Current accounts in these economies were generally in deficit 
except Singapore and Taiwan in 1996. In 1997 and 1998 the current account balances 
were much higher in all of them except Taiwan and Japan.36  
 
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
                                                 
 
35 Bartov and Bodnar (1994) argue that the impact of the exchange rate change on a firm depends on 
whether the firm has long or short economic position in the foreign currency. U.S. firms with a net long 
economic position (including exporters and firms with future cash inflows in foreign currency) will benefit 
(suffer) from a depreciation (appreciation) of the dollar, while U.S. firms with a net short economic 
position (including importers and firms with future cash outflows in foreign currency) will suffer (benefit) 
from a depreciation (appreciation) of the dollar. 
36 The low-frequency data available for macroeconomic indicators here might not illustrate the short-run 
dynamics in the currency market and stock market, but rather provide a picture of the long run impact. 
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 The second channel is through the financial sector and could happen to emerging 
economies that adopt pegged or fixed exchange rate systems and experience a currency 
crisis. It is well known that banks and companies in the crisis countries had borrowed 
heavily from the international money market before the Asian crisis, in the form of short-
term loans in foreign currency, to take advantage of the interest rate differential. Since 
most of the countries pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar before the crisis, these 
borrowers did not expect foreign exchange risks and therefore did not hedge the risks. 
When the devaluation of a currency occurred during a currency crisis, banks and 
companies suffered from a great loss due to the currency and maturity mismatches in 
their balance sheets. When they could not roll over their short-term debts in the 
international capital markets, the stock markets experienced financial chaos.37 As can be 
seen in Table 4.1 Panel B, the foreign liabilities in terms of national currency in 1997 
increased dramatically after the devaluation or depreciation of the national currency. It 
indicates the seriousness of the exchange rate risk during a period of currency crisis.  
  However, both channels could be at work simultaneously. In this study, the 
objective is not to identify clearly what the transmission channel is, but mainly focus on 
the dominant effect at different times. While the financial contagion across countries is 
studied by many, the financial contagion across assets is not, especially when the 
                                                 
 
37 Chang and Velasco (1998) set up a model that explains international illiquidity as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for financial crashes and/or balance-of-payments crises. As they define, international 
illiquidity is a maturity mismatch of a financial system’s international assets and liabilities. The model 
assumes a bank that can accept demand deposits from domestic residents and borrow in the world market 
and can invest either in the world asset (liquid asset) or the long run asset to maximize their profits (zero 
profit in competitive markets). However, when domestic depositors and foreign creditors lose confidence 
in the banks as what happened in 1997, they will try to withdraw their money or not to roll over their loans 
in the short run, the banks have to liquidate some of their long term assets, which is costly. 
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currency markets experienced two different exchange rate regimes. Most of the countries 
changed from a pegged system to a managed floating system except Hong Kong and 
Malaysia during the Asian crisis. Hong Kong still kept its currency board system and 
Malaysia adopted a fixed exchange rate system after September 1998. This change of 
exchange rate regime leads to different perceptions about the exchange rate risks, and 
therefore results in a nonlinear relationship between stock returns and exchange rate 
changes.  
The two channels through which currency market shocks can be transmitted to 
stock markets indicate that the relationship between stock returns and exchange rate 
fluctuations might not be linear. The dominant channel will determine the direction and 
magnitude of the relationship. This study examines the contagion from the currency 
markets to the stock markets in the Asian crisis countries and the nonlinear relationships 
between stock returns and exchange rate changes by using a Markov regime-switching 
model. It endogenously determines the regimes at any time and provides different 
estimates of exchange rate exposure of the stock markets at different times. The major 
finding is that the mean equation of the two-regime model with different variances seems 
to be a relatively good fit and shows intuitive results across countries. The exchange rate 
exposure is channeled mainly through the financial aspect during the “high volatility” 
regime, and through the real sector during the “low volatility” regime. This is consistent 
with the main hypothesis. 
This chapter has two important policy implications for policy makers and those 
companies or banks that borrow from foreign countries in an emerging economy. When 
the policy makers choose to devalue a currency in a pegged exchange rate system under 
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speculative attack, they should not only consider the real sector effect, but also take into 
account the cost of the financial channel effect. This cost might be extremely high for 
economies that borrow short-term loans heavily in foreign currency in a high growth 
environment, like the Asian economies did in the mid-1990s. For companies and banks 
that borrow heavily from the international capital markets under the pegged exchange 
rate system, they should realize different types of exchange rate exposure they may face 
when the exchange rate system changes.  Appropriate hedging strategies should be 
adopted if the probability of an impending crisis is high.  
 The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the literature 
on exchange rate risk and regime switching models and Section 4.3 presents the data and 
methodology used in this study. Section 4.4 shows the empirical results and Section 4.5 
summarizes the findings. 
 
4.2 Literature Review  
4.2.1 Empirical Studies on Exchange Rate Risk in the Stock Markets 
 Most of the studies in the existing literature have focused on multi-factor asset 
pricing models and examined whether the exposure to exchange rate risk is priced in 
stock returns or not. Starting with Jorion (1990), many papers have measured the 
exchange rate exposure of U.S. firm and industry stock or portfolio returns (see, for 
example, Bartov and Bodnar, 1994). Further on, studies were extended to other countries, 
such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Mexico, using national stock index or 
firm/industry level data (see, for example, Bailey and Chung, 1995; Dumas and Solnik, 
1995; He and Ng, 1998).  
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However, the results are mixed. Jorion (1990) examines the exposure of U.S. 
industries to movements in the value of the dollar and finds that the exposure is quite 
different for different industries and the exposure is only significant for a few industries. 
Then in the APT model, it is shown that the exchange rate exposure is not priced in the 
stock returns of industry portfolios, possibly due to the assumption of constant pricing of 
exchange risk. Bartov and Bodnar (1994) find that lagged changes in the dollar are a 
significant variable in explaining current abnormal returns of their selected sample firms. 
Their reasons for an insignificant relationship between exchange rate changes and stock 
returns in the literature are the lagged effects and sample selection bias.  
Using industry data from Japan and following Jorion (1990), Choi et al. (1998) 
find that the exchange risk is priced in the Japanese stock market. He and Ng (1998) take 
a different approach and examine the factors that could affect a Japanese multinational 
firm’s foreign exchange exposure. They find that 25% of the sample have significant 
positive exposure, indicating that a depreciating yen has a favorable impact on Japanese 
MNCs whose exports form at least 10% of their sales. The exposure is determined by 
their level of export ratio and proxies for the firms’ hedging policies.  
The previously mentioned studies mostly concern developed economies with 
floating exchange rate systems and do not involve a change in exchange rate systems. 
This chapter is examining the different exchange rate exposure that the Asian economies 
faced when the exchange rate system changed dramatically during the Asian crisis.  
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4.2.2 Theoretical Development of Regime Switching Models  
Hamilton (1989) first proposes the Markov switching ARIMA model, trying to 
model GDP growth rates in two possible states (expansion and contraction). The state 
variable is unobserved and modeled as a first-order Markov-process. This implies that the 
current regime only depends on the regime one period ago and the model defines the 
transition probabilities of moving from one state to the other. The regime switching 
models in the mean equations have been widely used since then.  
However, the financial literature realized the heteroskedasticity of high-frequency 
financial series and used various GARCH models to show the properties of the time-
varying volatility (see Bollerslev et al. (1992) for a detailed survey). Another strand of 
research has acknowledged the importance of large sudden shifts in volatility and their 
usefulness for estimating volatility persistence, and has used different techniques to deal 
with it. Lastrapes (1989), for example, applied the ARCH model to exchange rates and 
found that there is a significant reduction in the estimated volatility persistence if controls 
for monetary regime shifts are incorporated in the standard ARCH model.  
While those monetary regime shifts were exogenously determined, Hamilton and 
Susmel (1994) employ a Markov-ARCH model (or SWARCH) for weekly U.S. stock 
returns and determine the structural changes endogenously. They illustrate that the 
traditional ARCH specifications have poor forecasting performance and spuriously high 
persistence in volatility and argue that those extremely large shocks such as 1987 stock 
market crash might have different consequences for subsequent volatility than do small 
shocks accounted for by the traditional ARCH models. They find that most of the 
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persistence in stock price volatility is attributed to the persistence of low-, moderate-, and 
high-volatility regimes, which typically last for several years.  
Later on, Gray (1996) extends the approach to GARCH models and solves the 
well-known path-dependency problem. At each time step, the conditional variance is 
obtained by aggregating the conditional variances from the two states in the previous 
period weighted by the regime probabilities. This aggregated conditional variance is then 
used to compute the conditional variance for the next period. This model assumes that the 
conditional variance at a certain time step is only dependent on the current regime, but 
not the entire past sequence of the regimes, and makes the GARCH / regime switching 
model tractable. To solve this path-dependency problem, Dueker (1997) uses a collapsing 
procedure that treats the conditional variance as a function of the most recent values of 
the state variable. This procedure greatly facilitates evaluation of the likelihood function 
at the cost of introducing a degree of approximation that does not appear to distort the 
calculated likelihood by much.  
Since then, there have been many variants of regime-switching models in the 
financial literature. For example, Dewachter (2001) uses different transition probabilities 
for mean equation and variance equations. Klaassen (2002) uses somewhat different 
variance equation setup from Gray (1996) to facilitate the multi-period-ahead variance 
forecasting.  
  
4.2.3 Empirical Applications of Regime Switching Models 
 There have been many applications of regime-switching models in the financial 
literature, especially to the exchange rate, stock price and commodity price dynamics. 
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Those include applications to the stock returns by Hamilton and Susmel (1994), Schaller 
and van Norden (1997), Dueker (1997) and Hess (2003); applications to the exchange 
rates by Fong (1998), Dewachter (2001) and Klaassen (2002); and applications to the 
interest rate by Gray (1996); applications to the oil price by Fong and See (2002).  
 Although all of these studies find regime-switching models a good fit for the 
targeted financial assets, none specifically looks at the relationship between the exchange 
rate changes and stock returns using regime-switching models. As I explained in the 
introduction, the different channels of exchange rate exposure during the crisis gives us 
the opportunity to study the financial contagion effect across assets. Holmes and 
Maghrebi (2002) is the only paper that studies the relationship between stock returns and 
exchange rate changes. However, they do not consider the possible GARCH effect in the 
stock returns and only model the volatility as a constant within each regime. Their focus 
on the discrete stochastic process does not allow for the GARCH effects that mainly look 
at the impact of relatively small shocks on return volatility. In addition, they focus more 
on the asymmetric effects of small depreciation vs. large depreciation.  
 This chapter contributes to the literature by looking at the exchange rate 
exposures through different channels at different regimes, therefore trying to answer the 
question why the exchange rate exposure differs across regimes. A regime-switching 
model is used to distinguish the two regimes endogenously. A relatively new technique 
developed by Gray (1996) is also used to model both the mean and variance equations of 
the stock returns as dependent on two regimes.  
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
 This study uses Datastream quotations for daily stock indices and exchange rates 
of nine Asian countries during the period of January 1 1990 to March 21 2003. Stock 
returns and exchange rate changes are obtained by taking the first differences of natural 
logs of the two variables. In Figure 4.1, the bilateral exchange rate in terms of local 
currency per U.S. dollar is shown. The similar pattern among Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand is striking. All the exchange rates were pegged to 
the U.S. dollar and fluctuating within a small band before the crisis, while after the sharp 
devaluation during the Asian crisis, the exchange rates were in a managed floating 
pattern except Malaysia, which adopted the fixed system. Figure 4.2 shows the exchange 
rate changes of these economies. Not surprisingly, the turmoil during the crisis brought 
extremely high volatility to the exchange rates. The descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 are 
consistent with what we’ve seen in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. The exchange rate changes 
are highly skewed and leptokurtic, indicating the existence of extreme values and 
volatility clustering.  
 
[Insert Figure 4.1 about here] 
[Insert Figure 4.2 about here] 
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
  
 First, in order to measure the exchange rate exposure of the national stock returns, 
single-regime linear model is estimated as the following: 
tt
US
ttt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 , ),0(~ hNtε      (4.1) 
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where ,  and  are the stock return in country i, stock return in the U.S. and 
exchange rate change in country i, respectively. The 1-day lagged US stock return  is 
used to account for global shocks. The 1-day lagged exchange rate change  is used to 
avoid the endogeneity problem.
tR
US
tR tX
US
tR 1−
1−tX
38  The exchange rate exposure is measured by the 
coefficient θ . In the traditional framework, θ  should be positive, indicating that a 
depreciation of the currency will benefit the economy in terms of trade balances and 
therefore boost up the stock market. It could also be insignificant because of high import 
content or rational expectation. However, as discussed before, the possible financial 
channel through the borrowers’ balance sheets creates the possibility that θ  might be 
negative. 
 Second, to distinguish different channels of currency market shocks, the stock 
return is modeled with the mean equation dependent on two regimes:  
ttttt StS
US
tStSSt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 , ),0(~ hNtSε     (4.2) 
The intercept and coefficients are all assumed to be dependent on the unobserved state St. 
The variance of the residual is assumed to be constant throughout the sample period. 
Switching probabilities of St is assumed to have a first-order Markov structure: 
Pr[St=1|St-1=1]=P11 
Pr[St=2|St-1=1]=1-P11 
Pr[St=1|St-1=2]=1-P22 
Pr[St=2|St-1=2]=P22 
                                                 
 
38 Bartov and Bodnar (1994) find that lagged changes in dollar are significant in explaining abnormal 
returns while contemporary changes in dollar are not. 
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 In order to estimate the parameters and the probabilities, the following 
conditional likelihood function needs to be maximized:39 
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In equation (4.2), θ  could have different signs in different regimes. If the contagion from 
a currency market to a stock market is more through the real channel, then it could be 
positive, negative or insignificant; if more through the financial channel, then it could be 
only negative.  
However, the constant-variance assumption in equation (4.2) is not realistic. It is 
well known that the high-frequency financial series has the volatility clustering property, 
which justifies different volatilities in two different regimes. Therefore, the following 
                                                 
 
39 For details of estimation procedure, see Gray (1996).  
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equation assumes constant volatility within each regime but different volatility across 
regimes, and is estimated further to account for regime switching in volatility: 
 , 
ttttt StS
US
tStSSt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 ),0(~ tt SS hNε  .   (4.3) 
To test the regime switches in the exchange rate exposure, another restricted 
version of equation (4.3) is also estimated and then likelihood ratio tests are conducted:  
tttt St
US
tStSSt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 , ),0(~ tt SS hNε .    (4.4) 
Equation (4.4) assumes constant exchange rate exposure during the entire sample period, 
while still keeping other parameters in the equation dependent on two different regimes.  
The likelihood ratio test is calculated as: 
)(~)(2 2 nllLR ur χ−−=  
where  and  are the maximized values of the (Gaussian) log likelihood function of 
the unrestricted and restricted models, respectively. Under the null hypothesis that the 
additional parameters are not jointly significant, the LR statistic has an asymptotic 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. Relative to 
equation (4.3), which is the unrestricted model here, both equation (4.2) and (4.4) are 
restricted models. Equation (4.2) imposes the restriction that the variance is constant 
across regimes while equation (4.3) imposes the restriction that the exchange rate 
exposure is constant. The number of restrictions is one.  
ul rl
 Since the literature has shown tremendous evidence of GARCH effects in high 
frequency financial data, the discrete division of the regimes into two may not be 
sufficient. However, the traditional GARCH model will encounter the path-dependency 
problem because conditional variance at time t depends on the conditional variance at 
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time t-1, which depends on the regime at time t-1 and on the conditional variance at time 
t-2, and so on. Consequently, the conditional variance at time t depends on the entire 
sequence of regimes up to time t (Gray, 1996). Therefore, Gray (1996) suggests 
aggregation of conditional variance across regimes to get rid of the path-dependence 
problem. The conditional density of the residuals from the mean equation is assumed to 
be a mixture of distributions with time-varying mixing parameters, and the variance 
equation is modeled as: 
1
2
1, −− ++= tStSStS hh tttt βεαλ         (4.5)  
2
1211111112
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2
11111 ])1([])[1(][ −−−−−−−−−−− −+−+−++= ttttttttttt pphphph ττττ  (4.6) 
])1([ 1211111111 −−−−−− −+−= tttttt ppR ττε       (4.7) 
where  is the conditional probability of staying in regime 1 at time t, 
, and .  
tp1
1 +µ 1121212111 −−−−− +++= ttUSttt XRR εθωφτ 12222222212 −−−−− ++++= ttUSttt XRR εθωφµτ
The coefficients for the variance equations are expected to be significant, and 
1<+ βα  so that the variance is stationary. The value of βα
λ
−−1  is the unconditional 
variance. One important assumption in this model is that the residual is assumed to be a 
normal distribution, so that at each time step the conditional variance can be aggregated 
at each step and be used to compute the conditional variances at the next time step.  
 
4.4 Empirical Results on Mean Equations with Regime-Switching 
 According to the methodology section, various specifications of the Markov 
regime-switching models are estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function. For 
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comparison purposes, the single regime model in equation (4.1) is estimated first (see 
Table 4.3). Mean reversion in stock returns (negative φ ) does not appear to exist in any 
cases except for Japan. The U.S. stock return seems to have a consistently large impact 
on the Asian economies, corroborating its leading economic position in the global 
market. The foreign exchange exposure is shown to be only significantly positive in 
Thailand and Hong Kong’s cases, insignificant in Indonesia’s case, but significantly 
negative in all other six cases. This dominance in negative foreign exchange exposure 
contradicts the traditional viewpoint of transmission of currency shocks through the real 
channel and indicates the possibility of the financial channel.  
 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
 
Therefore equation (4.2) is estimated with regime switches in all the parameters 
in the stock return equation, assuming same variance in different regimes. Regime 1 is 
defined as a “high return” regime and Regime 2 is defined as a “low return” regime. As 
can be seen from the estimation results in Table 4.4, the drift terms are generally in 
opposite signs. Mean reversion occurs in the “high return” regime in Thailand, Indonesia, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan.  Interestingly, the exchange rate exposure has 
negative signs in the “low return” regime in all cases except Indonesia, indicating the 
existence of the financial channel. In the other regime, it is either significantly positive 
(in Thailand’s case), or significantly negative (in Taiwan’s case), or insignificant (in all 
the other cases). The “high return” regime seems to be more persistent and lasts from 4 to 
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111 days. The “low return” regime is less persistent and only lasts about 1 to 2 days.40  
Diagnostic statistic LB2(15) is calculated to see if there is any time-varying volatility. 
The large significant Ljung-Box statistic for the squared standardized residuals strongly 
suggests the possible different volatility in the two regimes.   
 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 
Therefore, equation (4.3) is estimated with different variances in two regimes to 
at least account for discrete changes in variance across regimes. The results are shown in 
Table 4.5.  After accounting for different variances, the drift terms mostly become 
insignificant and therefore, it is difficult to identify “high-return” and “low-return” 
regimes. Also, the mean reversion phenomenon disappears except in Japan’s case. 
However, two regimes according to volatility can be identified as “high volatility” and 
“low volatility” regimes. The first row in each country’s case is the “high volatility” 
regime and the second row is the “low volatility” regime. Compared with the “low 
volatility” regime, the volatility is at least one time higher up to almost three times higher 
in the “high volatility” regime. In the “high volatility” regime, five out of nine cases 
(Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) turn out to have significant 
and negative foreign exchange exposure and two cases have insignificant and negative 
exposure (Indonesia and Japan). Malaysia adopted a fixed exchange rate system after 
September 1998, so the negative exchange rate exposure totally accounted for what 
                                                 
 
40 The persistence of each regime is calculated as 
111
1
P−
 and 
221
1
P−
 for regime 1 and 2 respectively.  
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happened during the Asian crisis, not after the crisis. Since Japan has a free floating 
exchange rate system, the significant and positive exchange rate exposure is not 
surprising. Hong Kong kept its currency board system throughout the sample and the 
fluctuation of the Hong Kong dollar was within a very small range. Therefore, the 
exchange rate exposure turns out not to be significant, indicating little exchange rate risk 
in Hong Kong. It is a little surprising that both the coefficients for exchange rate 
exposure turn out to be positive for Thailand, although not significant. However, in 
Thailand’s case, it might be that the early devaluation of the Thai baht did give 
Thailand’s companies competitive advantage in the export sector, therefore alleviating 
the financial channel effect.41 In the “low volatility” regime, only Malaysia and Japan 
have significant and positive foreign exchange exposure and only the Philippines shows 
statistically significant and negative exposure. All the other 6 cases have insignificant 
exposure to exchange risk. This is consistent with the hypothesis that during the “high 
volatility” regime, the exchange rate exposure is channeled through the balance sheet 
effect while during the “low volatility” regime, the exchange rate exposure is channeled 
through the real sector effect. 42 
 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
 
  There is persistence in both regimes with P11 and P22 both exceeding or close to 
0.9. The average days in each regime is calculated and put into the brackets below each 
                                                 
 
41  From Table 4.1 it can also be seen that Thailand improved its current account condition in 1997 
compared with 1996 and 1995 while the others had a much smaller improvement.  
42 A word of caution, though, is that the “high volatility” regime is not limited to the crisis period and 
might include other periods with local political turmoil, regional chaos, etc.  
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transition probability. For example, for Thailand, the “low volatility” regime on average 
lasts about 30 days while the “high volatility” regime on average lasts 13 days. It seems 
that the “low volatility” regime is more persistent than the “high volatility” regime. Some 
diagnostic statistics are reported. There is still significant autocorrelation in the squared 
standardized residuals, shown in LB2(15), but the statistics are much lower than those in 
Table 4.4. The log likelihood function value enables us to conduct a likelihood ratio test 
to see which equation is a better fit. In equation (4.2), the coefficient for exchange rate 
exposure is assumed to be equal, so it is considered the restricted model and equation 
(4.3) is considered the unrestricted model. The test statistics are reported in the second 
column of Table 4.6, showing a better fit of the unrestricted model – equation (4.3) with 
regime switching in the variance.   
 
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
 
 To further test whether the regime switching in the foreign exchange exposure is 
warranted, equation (4.4) is estimated and the likelihood ratio test is conducted. The 
estimation results are reported in Table 4.7 and the likelihood ratio test statistics are 
shown in the third column of Table 4.6. As can be seen from Table 4.7, the estimation 
results are quite similar to Table 4.5. The regimes are divided between “high volatility” 
and “low volatility” and the persistence of each regime is almost the same as in Table 4.5. 
The LB2(15) statistics are slightly lower in all cases in Table 4.5 except the Philippines 
case. The likelihood ratio test shows that equation (4.3) is a better fit for Thailand, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, Singapore and Japan, while for the other three, 
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equation (4.4) seems to be a better fit and more parsimonious. For Hong Kong, this result 
is not surprising, because it kept its currency board system during the crisis, therefore not 
exposing companies to greater exchange rate risks. Generally speaking, the two-regime 
models in mean equation with different variances are a better fit to describe the exchange 
rate risk at different regimes.  
 
[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
 
After fitting the data with the two-regime model in mean equation with different 
variances, both the stock return and the conditional probability in the “high volatility” 
regime for each country are shown in Figure 4.3. The stock return volatility seems to 
correspond with the low vs. high regimes defined in the previous text. A common 
observation of the graphs for each stock market is that during the Asian crisis, the 
conditional probability of being in the “high volatility” regime was more frequent and 
stock markets moved more sharply across regimes. Although these graphs do not 
determine when the exchange rate regimes changed during the crisis, they do show that 
the stock markets are frequently changing between two regimes, with underlying 
economic fundamentals also changing.  
 
[Insert Figure 4.3 about here] 
 
  As can be seen, Tables 4.5 & 4.7 still show significant autocorrelation in the 
squared standardized residuals, which justifies use of regime switching GARCH models 
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to account for not only large shifts in volatility across regimes, but also the impact of 
small shocks on the conditional variance. Equations (4.5) to (4.7) plus the mean equation 
(4.3) are estimated simultaneously and the results are reported in the Table 4.8. The 
results seem to be very different from those in Table 4.4. Most of the significant 
exchange rate exposure effects disappear except for Malaysia and Taiwan. Thailand, on 
the other hand, turns out to have the wrong direction of signs on the exchange rate 
exposure, although it is still significant. According to the unconditional variance 
calculated from βα
λ
−−1 , the regimes again are divided into “low volatility” and “high 
volatility” regimes, with the former on the first row and the latter on the second row for 
each country. However, it is surprising and even counter-intuitive that the “high 
volatility” regime is more persistent than the “low volatility” regime in all but the 
Indonesia and Malaysia cases. It is not surprising that the persistence of the shocks 
)( βα +  is much lower than 1 after accounting for regime shifts in variance equations. 
This is consistent with the literature, which generally finds conditional variance in 
traditional GARCH models very close to 1 due to the inability to incorporate large shifts 
(Lastrapes, 1989).  
 
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
 
Diagnostic statistics show that after accounting for GARCH effects, the 
autocorrelation of the squared standardized effects is much smaller, although still 
significantly. The likelihood ratio tests of the regime-switching GARCH model vs. two-
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regime model in mean equation with different variances are shown in the fourth column 
of Table 4.7. The regime-switching GARCH model, in terms of diagnostic statistics, is a 
better fit than the two-regime model in mean equation with different variances. However, 
in terms of intuitive explanation, the latter does a better job. One reason might be that the 
assumption for the regime-switching GARCH model may not be realistic because the 
stock returns are well known to be non-normal and can be seen from the descriptive 
statistics in Table 4.2.  
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 This chapter examines the exchange rate exposure of the national stock returns for 
the nine Asian economies during the sample period 1990 to 2003. Two possible 
transmission channels of currency shocks to stock markets are proposed. The first is 
through the real sector, with possible impacts of exchange rate changes on exports, 
imports and expected price. The second is through the financial sector, with impact on 
the liabilities on the balance sheets. The hypothesis here is that the financial channel is 
more dominant during the crisis period (or “high volatility” regime), while the real 
channel is more dominant during the tranquil period (or “low volatility” regime). None of 
the previous literature works has distinguished the two possible channels of contagion 
across assets; rather the literature has only considered the real channel.  
This study applies the regime-switching models to this problem and finds strong 
supporting evidence for the financial channel during the crisis. Although the regime-
switching GARCH model is a better fit, it does not provide an intuitive explanation of the 
coefficients. On the other hand, the two-regime model in mean equation with different 
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variances seems to be a good fit and shows consistent results across countries. The “low 
volatility” and “high volatility” regimes are identified and the former is more persistent. 
The exchange rate exposure is channeled mainly through the financial aspect during the 
“high volatility” regime, while through the real sector effect during the “low volatility” 
regime. However, for Thailand, the real sector effect seems to be strong in both regimes, 
which makes sense due to the earliest depreciation of its currency during the crisis.  
Improvements can be done to this study. First, if firm or industry level data is 
available for the crisis countries, it would constitute a better sample to look at the 
different exchange rate exposure at different times. Aggregate national stock indices may 
incorporate both export and import firms that can cancel out some of the real sector 
effects. Second, the methodology could be improved by modeling both stock returns and 
exchange rate changes as endogenous and dependent on two regimes. Exchange rate 
changes are endogenous variables, although in this case they are more controlled before 
the crisis. Third, improvement on the regime-switching GARCH models can be done by 
assuming two different state variables that depend on different regimes and this may 
provide more intuitive results in the future.  
This chapter has important policy implications for policy makers and companies 
or banks that borrow from foreign countries in an emerging economy. The policy makers 
have to consider the high cost of financial channel effect when they decide to devalue the 
currency under a pegged exchange rate system. Companies and banks that borrow 
heavily from the international capital markets should be aware of the possible exchange 
rate risk that they may face once the exchange rate system collapse in a crisis and hedge 
appropriately.  
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APPENDEX A: Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1a Descriptive Statistics of Stock Returns (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera LB(16)
Hong Kong 0.034 0 17.247 -14.735 1.669 -0.021 12.632* 13333.32* 45.05*
Indonesia -0.0004 0 13.128 -12.732 1.539 0.353* 14.228* 18188.95* 217.32*
Japan -0.045 0 12.430 -7.234 1.502 0.261* 6.465* 1764.16* 28.41**
Korea -0.013 0 10.024 -12.805 1.994 0.0001 6.712* 1979.95* 29.69**
Malaysia 0.001 0 18.773 -20.630 1.614 0.531* 28.915* 96670.48* 92.98*
Philippines -0.002 0 16.178 -9.744 1.612 0.556* 11.868* 11477.66* 176.79*
Singapore 0.004 0 14.869 -9.672 1.339 0.234* 13.623* 16247.25* 117.67*
Taiwan -0.022 0 12.836 -10.289 2.011 -0.030 6.124* 1402.69* 52.70*
Thailand -0.026 0 11.350 -10.028 1.831 0.268* 7.613* 3099.78* 100.31*
U.S. 0.027 0.002 5.573 -7.113 1.042 -0.094** 6.882* 2170.24* 30.62**
Note: Observations for all series are 3449. *, ** denotes significance levels at 1% and 5% respectively. All 
variables are first differences of the natural log of stock indices. LB(16) refers to Ljung Box statistics with 
16-day lag. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1b Stock Market Characteristics (Year-End 1996) 
 Total Market Capitalization Total Value Traded 
Hong Kong 449,381 166,419 
Indonesia 91,016 32,142 
Japan 3,088,850 1,251,998 
Korea 138,817 177,266 
Malaysia 307,179 173,568 
Philippines 80,649 25,519 
Singapore 150,215 42,739 
Taiwan 273,608 470,193 
Thailand 99,828 44,365 
U.S. 8,484,433 7,121,487 
 Source: Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Unit: millions of US dollars. 
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Table 2.2a Simple correlation matrix of stock returns before and after the Crisis 
(July 2, 1997 as the break point) 
 
Before the crisis:
 HK IN JP KO MA PH SG TH TW 
HK 1.000         
IN 0.172 1.000        
JP 0.251 0.060 1.000       
KO 0.077 0.015 0.047 1.000      
MA 0.434 0.208 0.237 0.108 1.000     
PH 0.200 0.188 0.082 0.053 0.226 1.000    
SG 0.504 0.222 0.319 0.133 0.640 0.266 1.000   
TH 0.310 0.158 0.148 0.141 0.358 0.211 0.391 1.000  
TW 0.141 0.043 0.143 0.094 0.142 0.139 0.174 0.141 1.000 
After the crisis: 
 HK IN JP KO MA PH SG TH TW 
HK 1.000         
IN 0.339 1.000        
JP 0.433 0.198 1.000       
KO 0.355 0.184 0.317 1.000      
MA 0.336 0.262 0.211 0.215 1.000     
PH 0.351 0.312 0.183 0.215 0.213 1.000    
SG 0.649 0.404 0.375 0.356 0.385 0.407 1.000   
TH 0.372 0.341 0.229 0.311 0.336 0.314 0.454 1.000  
TW 0.267 0.155 0.218 0.260 0.171 0.146 0.284 0.206 1.000 
Note: HK, IN, JP, KO, PH, MA, SG, TH, and TW represent the stock returns of Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan, respectively. The bold are the 
cases for correlation decreases after the crisis. 
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Table 2.2b Test of Significant Increases in Correlation Coefficients (Thailand and 
Hong Kong as the Source of Contagion) 
 
 Correlation Correlation Adj. Correlation Z-Stat Z-stat
 before crisis after crisis after crisis (Unadjusted) (Adjusted) 
Thailand as the source:  
TH-HK 0.310 0.372 0.310 -2.041** 0.012 
TH-IN 0.158 0.341 0.283 -5.695* -3.817* 
TH-JP 0.148 0.229 0.188 -2.443* -1.189 
TH-KO 0.141 0.311 0.257 -5.224* -3.515* 
TH-PH 0.211 0.314 0.260 -3.220* -1.494*** 
TH-SG 0.391 0.454 0.383 -2.231** 0.290 
TH-TW 0.141 0.206 0.169 -1.949** -0.822 
Hong Kong as the source:     
HK-TH 0.286 0.398 0.278 -3.702* 0.245 
HK-PH 0.211 0.354 0.245 -4.524* -1.035 
HK-IN 0.203 0.334 0.230 -4.094* -0.813 
HK-SG 0.512 0.650 0.496 -6.114* 0.629 
HK-TW 0.139 0.272 0.185 -4.032* -1.371*** 
HK-JP 0.254 0.437 0.308 -6.069* -1.719** 
HK-KO 0.084 0.361 0.250 -8.553* -4.990* 
Note: Same as in Table 2.2a. Adjustment of the correlation is given in Equation (2.1). Z-tests are given in 
footnote (8). The null hypothesis is no increase in correlation. The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical value for a 
one-sided test of the null is –2.32, -1.64, and –1.28 respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. Malaysia is not included due to a decrease in correlations after the crisis.  
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Table 2.2c Test of Significant Increases in Simple Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlation Correlation Adj. Correlation Z-Stat Z-stat
 before crisis after crisis after crisis (Unadjusted) (Adjusted)
TH-HK 0.310 0.372 0.310 -2.041** 0.012
TH-IN 0.158 0.341 0.283 -5.695* -3.817* 
TH-JP 0.148 0.229 0.188 -2.443* -1.189 
TH-KO 0.141 0.311 0.257 -5.224* -3.515* 
TH-PH 0.211 0.314 0.260 -3.220* -1.494*** 
TH-SG 0.391 0.454 0.383 -2.231** 0.290 
TH-TW 0.141 0.206 0.169 -1.949** -0.822 
PH-HK 0.200 0.351 0.309 -4.763* -3.402* 
PH-IN 0.188 0.312 0.274 -3.852* -2.644* 
PH-JP 0.082 0.183 0.159 -2.992* -2.286** 
PH-KO 0.053 0.215 0.188 -4.807* -3.977* 
PH-SG 0.266 0.407 0.361 -4.636* -3.053* 
PH-TW 0.139 0.146 0.127 -0.208 0.355 
MA-IN 0.208 0.262 0.164 -1.662* 1.316 
MA-KO 0.108 0.215 0.134 -3.197* -0.763 
MA-TW 0.142 0.171 0.106 -0.864 1.066 
IN-HK 0.172 0.339 0.172 -5.211* -0.007 
IN-JP 0.060 0.198 0.098 -4.087* -1.098 
IN-KO 0.015 0.184 0.090 -4.975* -2.201** 
IN-SG 0.222 0.404 0.210 -5.892* 0.380 
IN-TW 0.043 0.155 0.076 -3.292* -0.960 
SG-HK 0.504 0.649 0.455 -6.364* 1.861 
SG-JP 0.319 0.375 0.235 -1.852** 2.638 
SG-KO 0.133 0.356 0.222 -6.934* -2.683* 
SG-TW 0.174 0.284 0.175 -3.379* -0.017 
TW-HK 0.141 0.267 0.309 -3.828* -5.174* 
TW-JP 0.143 0.218 0.254 -2.255** -3.357* 
TW-KO 0.094 0.260 0.302 -4.995* -6.307* 
HK-JP 0.251 0.433 0.300 -6.021* -1.550*** 
HK-KO 0.077 0.355 0.241 -8.547* -4.918* 
KO-JP 0.047 0.317 0.092 -8.177* -1.326*** 
Note: same as Table 2.2b. Pair-wise correlations between the stock returns in Malaysia and those in 
Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore are not included because these correlation 
coefficients decreased after the crisis. 
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Table 2.3 Estimation results from GARCH-DCC model 
 
 Return Equations Variance Equations 
 0γ  1γ  2γ  c  a  b  Persistence
TH 0.0448*** 0.057* 0.228* 0.0615* 0.878* 0.109* 0.987 
 (1.756) (4.173) (8.733) (4.979) (88.771) (12.057)  
IN 0.0162 0.218* 0.155* 0.0137* 0.894* 0.117* 1.011 
 (0.972) (15.163) (8.778) (4.333) (131.86) (13.279)  
MA 0.0551* 0.129* 0.218* 0.0256* 0.892* 0.099* 0.991 
 (3.224) (9.856) (14.090) (5.817) (117.59) (13.084)  
KO 0.0145 0.001 0.324* 0.0454* 0.908* 0.082* 0.990 
 (0.498) (0.036) (12.374) (4.165) (79.678) (8.038)  
HK 0.0885* -0.030* 0.474* 0.0363* 0.926* 0.058* 0.984 
 (4.532) (-2.568) (23.344) (6.018) (160.23) (13.712)  
JP -0.0005 -0.046* 0.360* 0.0488* 0.899* 0.0798* 0.978 
 (-0.023) (-3.294) (18.270) (7.457) (123.41) (13.332)  
PH 0.0289 0.157* 0.282* 0.0582* 0.889* 0.0948* 0.983 
 (1.165) (10.703) (11.773) (5.359) (97.069) (11.975)  
SG 0.0457* 0.049* 0.330* 0.0316* 0.910* 0.071* 0.981 
 (3.301) (4.073) (18.451) (5.219) (85.734) (8.789)  
TW 0.0337 0.015 0.264* 0.0607* 0.917* 0.066* 0.983 
 (1.124) (1.183) (9.090) (5.601) (105.89) (9.545)  
US 0.0559* 0.015  0.0047* 0.943* 0.055* 0.998 
 (3.568) (0.979)  (3.434) (151.25) (8.624)  
Note: the same as Table 2.2. US represent the U.S. stock return. The estimates of the mean reverting 
process are α =0.006 (7.278), β =0.989 (480.292).  The persistence level of the variance is calculated 
as the summation of the coefficients in the variance equations (a+b). The t-stats are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level with critical values of 2.58, 1.96, and 1.65 respectively.   
Return Equations:       (2.2) t
US
ttt RRR εγγγ +++= −− 12110
where , )',...,,( ,10,2,1 tttt RRRR = )',...,,( ,10,2,1 tttt εεεε = , ),0(~| 1 ttt HNI −ε . 
Variance Equations: h        i=1, 2, …, 10    (2.4) 2 1,1,, −− ++= tiitiiiitii bhac ε
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Table 2.4 Tests of Correlation Increase between Stock Returns of Thailand and 
Those of the Other Four Crisis Countries – GARCH Model (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea 
Mean Equation:      
Constant 0.0012*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0015*** 
 (3.563) (3.376) (3.506) (5.789) 
1−tρ  0.9947*** 0.9965*** 0.9958*** 0.9906*** 
 (617.596) (1644.042) (987.179) (629.207) 
tDM ,1  0.0011 -6.39E-06 0.0009 -5.31E-05 
 (0.988) (-0.006) (1.382) (-0.094) 
tDM ,2  0.0007* 0.0007*** 0.0007* 0.0011*** 
 (1.650) (2.750) (1.801) (2.794) 
tDM ,3  -0.0002 0.0002 1.61E-05 0.0005*** 
 (-0.998) (1.531) (0.151) (2.742) 
Variance Equation:     
Constant 8.98E-06*** 4.77E-06*** 2.29E-06*** 1.14E-06*** 
 (38.033) (28.293) (38.054) (26.551) 
2
1−tε  0.3637*** 0.5425*** 0.3176*** 0.1440*** 
 (22.312) (25.467) (36.454) (34.172) 
1−th  0.3347*** 0.3816*** 0.7103*** 0.8274*** 
 (21.654) (25.760) (144.773) (256.083) 
tDM ,1  2.77E-05*** 2.96E-05*** 3.48E-06** 9.04E-07* 
 (6.773) (7.825) (2.270) (1.699) 
tDM ,2  1.87E-05*** 4.18E-06*** 1.21E-06*** 3.11E-06*** 
 (12.632) (8.092) (2.827) (8.489) 
tDM ,3  2.00E-06*** 2.88E-06** -8.18E-07*** 6.89E-07*** 
 (12.032) (25.663) (-12.967) (10.321) 
Q (16) 9.639 25.840* 24.245* 12.269 
ARCH(4)  0.063 0.481 3.108 3.833 
Note: These are estimates for Equation (2.8): and 
Equation (2.9): h . 
tij
k
p
ptijp
q
tqqtij DM ,
1
,3
3
1
,0, εραααρ +++= ∑∑
=
−+
=
tqDM ,2 tij,
q
qtijtijtij h
3
1
2
,21,10, ∑
=
+− +++= βεβββ ρ  is the correlation coefficient between 
the stock return of Thailand and those of the other four crisis countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Korea. ,   and  is the dummy variable for the first phase (7/2/1997-
11/17/1997), second phase (11/18/1997-12/31/1998) of the crisis period, and the post-crisis period 
(1/1/1999-3/21/2003) respectively. The lag length k  is determined by AIC criterion. Q(16) is the Ljung-
Box Q-statisitics up to 16 days, testing the serial correlation of the residuals. ARCH(4) is the ARCH LM 
test up to 4 days, testing the heteroskedasticity of the residuals. ***, ** and * represents significance level 
of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are Z-statistics. 
tDM ,1 tDM ,2 DM ,3 t
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Table 2.5a Variance Decomposition (Pre-crisis period: 1/1/1990-7/1/1997) 
Period Standard Error TH MA IN HK KO 
Variance Decomposition of TH:   
1 1.612 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 1.656 96.591 2.349 0.111 0.940 0.010
10 1.657 96.471 2.427 0.138 0.951 0.013
 Variance Decomposition of MA:  
1 1.216 11.225 88.775 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 1.232 11.587 88.324 0.025 0.038 0.025
10 1.233 11.598 88.302 0.032 0.042 0.026
 Variance Decomposition of IN:  
1 0.940 1.687 2.403 95.911 0.000 0.000
2 0.988 3.454 4.703 91.831 0.009 0.003
10 0.994 3.722 5.142 91.109 0.024 0.003
 Variance Decomposition of HK:  
1 1.326 9.046 12.015 0.583 78.356 0.000
2 1.331 9.129 12.385 0.591 77.838 0.058
10 1.331 9.131 12.393 0.594 77.824 0.058
 Variance Decomposition of KO:  
1 1.401 1.745 0.370 0.024 0.022 97.839
2 1.404 1.818 0.494 0.091 0.087 97.509
10 1.404 1.818 0.496 0.098 0.088 97.500
 
Table 2.5b Variance Decomposition (First Phase of the Crisis: 7/2/1997-11/16/1997) 
 Period Standard Error TH MA IN HK KO 
Variance Decomposition of TH:  
1 2.585 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 2.775 91.520 3.807 1.098 0.183 3.393
10 2.806 90.078 4.310 1.564 0.205 3.843
 Variance Decomposition of MA:  
1 2.490 3.170 96.830 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 2.594 3.726 92.465 2.254 1.551 0.004
10 2.616 3.887 91.174 3.276 1.652 0.010
 Variance Decomposition of IN:  
1 2.502 9.246 17.344 73.410 0.000 0.000
2 2.627 10.192 15.961 72.269 1.494 0.084
10 2.631 10.339 15.915 72.142 1.503 0.101
 Variance Decomposition of HK:  
1 3.486 0.760 20.494 13.475 65.271 0.000
2 3.577 0.803 19.801 13.970 64.381 1.045
10 3.581 0.803 19.835 14.052 64.259 1.051
 Variance Decomposition of KO:  
1 2.269 2.835 6.539 0.007 3.880 86.740
2 2.338 3.145 6.516 0.797 3.655 85.887
2.346 3.172 6.617 0.822 3.644 85.745
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Table 2.5c Variance Decomposition (Second Phase of the Crisis: 11/17/1997-12/31/1998) 
 Period Standard Error TH MA IN HK KO 
Variance Decomposition of TH:  
1 2.684 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 2.773 95.955 0.623 0.736 0.131 2.555
10 2.781 95.743 0.621 0.732 0.133 2.771
 Variance Decomposition of MA:      
1 3.383 14.870 85.130 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 3.445 14.850 82.160 1.502 1.300 0.188
10 3.452 14.943 81.854 1.502 1.312 0.389
 Variance Decomposition of IN:      
1 2.880 19.043 0.955 80.002 0.000 0.000
2 3.040 19.908 0.858 72.821 0.027 6.385
10 3.052 20.271 0.854 72.236 0.041 6.598
 Variance Decomposition of HK:      
1 2.633 26.501 2.701 2.306 68.492 0.000
2 2.694 27.206 2.656 2.586 65.430 2.121
10 2.700 27.337 2.650 2.587 65.177 2.249
 Variance Decomposition of KO:      
1 3.366 8.758 1.392 0.000 0.032 89.818
2 3.424 11.246 1.345 0.031 0.389 86.989
10 3.428 11.340 1.349 0.042 0.391 86.879
 
Table 2.5d Variance Decomposition (Post-Crisis Period: 1/1/1999-3/21/2003) 
 Period Standard Error TH MA IN HK KO 
Variance Decomposition of TH:  
1 1.704 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 1.720 98.567 0.590 0.407 0.170 0.266
10 1.720 98.559 0.593 0.411 0.170 0.267
 Variance Decomposition of MA:      
1 1.317 8.695 91.305 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 1.327 9.029 90.890 0.050 0.007 0.023
10 1.328 9.041 90.873 0.055 0.007 0.024
 Variance Decomposition of IN:      
1 1.607 5.160 1.375 93.465 0.000 0.000
2 1.625 6.319 1.365 92.298 0.016 0.002
10 1.626 6.346 1.370 92.260 0.019 0.005
 Variance Decomposition of HK:      
1 1.605 12.890 4.032 2.069 81.009 0.000
2 1.610 12.983 4.026 2.187 80.554 0.251
10 1.610 12.983 4.026 2.187 80.553 0.251
 Variance Decomposition of KO:      
1 2.328 10.623 1.287 1.339 14.700 72.051
2 2.333 10.852 1.327 1.335 14.734 71.752
10 2.333 10.852 1.327 1.335 14.735 71.752
Note: the same as Table 2.2. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Standard & Poor’s Rating Activity (1/1/1990 to 3/21/2003) 
 
First 
appearance 
in sample 
Number 
of rating 
changes 
Number 
of outlook 
changes 
Number of 
upgrades 
Number of 
downgrades 
Total 
number of 
changes 
Panel A: Whole sample     
Thailand 1/1/1990 4 6 4 6 10 
Indonesia 7/20/1992 15 3 5 13 18 
Malaysia 1/1/1990 8 8 9 7 16 
Philippines 7/2/1993 1 7 4 4 8 
Korea 1/1/1990 10 5 9 6 15 
Total  38 29 31 36 67 
Panel B: Crisis period (7/2/1997-12/31/1998)    
Thailand  3 1 0 4 4 
Indonesia  6 0 0 6 6 
Malaysia  4 2 0 6 6 
Philippines  1 1 0 2 2 
Korea  5 2 2 5 7 
Total  19 6 2 23 25 
Panel C: Tranquil period (1/1/1990-7/1/1997 & 1/1/1999-3/21/2003) 
Thailand  1 5 4 2 6 
Indonesia  9 3 5 7 12 
Malaysia  4 6 9 1 10 
Philippines  0 6 4 2 6 
Korea  5 3 7 1 8 
Total  19 23 29 13 42 
Source: Standard & Poor’s Creditweek 1990-2003. 
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Table 3.2 The Impact of Own Rating Changes and Foreign Rating Changes 
Explanatory  Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) 
Variables 
Whole 
Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil 
Period 
Whole 
Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil 
Period 
Constant -0.019 -0.152** -0.002 -0.021 -0.132* -0.003
 (-1.402) (-2.334) (-0.146) (-1.358) (-1.952) (-0.222) 
AR (1) 0.102*** 0.125*** 0.087*** 0.108*** 0.125*** 0.095*** 
 (6.011) (2.987) (6.554) (5.687) (2.962) (6.590) 
0.348*** 0.550*** 0.304*** 0.344*** 0.535*** 0.292*** US
tR 1−∆  (20.881) (9.516) (19.911) (19.564) (9.265) (18.266) 
Change in ratings:       
Own country 0.346*** 0.380 0.243* 0.323** 0.356 0.237* 
 (2.641) (1.266) (1.822) (2.491) (1.232) (1.801) 
Lag1 0.413** 0.862** 0.110 0.399* 0.815** 0.111 
 (1.965) (2.133) (1.110) (1.930) (2.093) (1.113) 
Lag2 -0.017 -0.239 -0.011 -0.012 -0.216 0.009 
 (-0.077) (-0.414) (-0.095) (-0.056) (-0.375) (0.082) 
Lag3 -0.045 0.005 0.036 -0.037 0.022 0.042 
 (-0.413) (0.020) (0.487) (-0.335) (0.079) (0.577) 
Lag4 -0.263 -0.730 -0.066 -0.249 -0.681 -0.054 
 (-0.978) (-1.027) (-0.797) (-0.924) (-0.957) (-0.650) 
Lead1 0.080 -0.023 0.069 0.055 -0.064 0.048 
 (0.334) (-0.037) (0.761) (0.230) (-0.101) (0.535) 
Lead2 0.071 0.176 -0.051 0.070 0.200 -0.048 
 (0.454) (0.507) (-0.383) (0.445) (0.571) (-0.357) 
Lead3 0.159 0.659* -0.035 0.160 0.662* -0.042 
 (0.991) (1.843) (-0.431) (0.979) (1.784) (-0.516) 
Lead4 -0.245 - 0.138* -0.252 -0.970*** 0.130* 
 (-1.279) (-3.113) (1.901) (-1.305) (-2.978) (1.810) 
Foreign countries    0.277*** 0.560*** 0.080 
    (2.859) (3.182) (0.683) 
Lag1    0.151** 0.154 0.064 
    (1.981) (1.113) (0.741) 
Lag2    0.048 0.066 -0.009 
    (0.640) (0.414) (-0.134) 
Lag3    -0.164** -0.474** 0.001 
    (-2.068) (-2.389) (0.029) 
Lag4    -0.068 -0.194 0.035 
    (-0.889) (-0.976) (0.640) 
Lead1    0.049 -0.132 0.074 
    (0.750) (-0.943) (1.174) 
Lead2    0.035 0.104 -0.012 
    (0.527) (0.615) (-0.253) 
Lead3    -0.018 -0.111 0.018 
    (-0.211) (-0.496) (0.321) 
Lead4    0.117 0.329 0.050 
    (1.555) (1.552) (1.163) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.058 0.084 0.052 0.063 0.092 0.054 
Number of observations 15626 1960 13666 12635 1965 10675 
Notes: the dependent variables are changes in stock returns for five Asian countries. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.3 The Impact of Own/Foreign Country Upgrades/Downgrades 
 
Whole Period Crisis Period Tranquil Period
Constant -0.009 -0.103 0.002
 (-0.691) (-1.548) (0.182) 
AR (1) 0.100*** 0.122*** 0.087*** 
 (5.901) (2.858) (6.582) 
0.346*** 0.542*** 0.302*** US
tR 1−∆  (21.062) (9.284) (20.663) 
Change in ratings:    
Own country, upgrade 0.302** -0.195 0.303*** 
 (2.201) (-1.045) (2.627) 
Lag1 0.162 1.343*** 0.027 
 (0.945) (3.996) (0.238) 
Lead1 -0.078 -1.633*** 0.067 
 (-0.340) (-5.495) (0.485) 
    
Foreign country, upgrade -0.022 1.114*** -0.192** 
 (-0.230) (6.205) (-2.441) 
Lag1 0.157 0.623*** 0.098 
 (1.629) (2.791) (0.954) 
Lead1 0.050 -0.652* 0.129 
 (0.519) (-1.773) (1.292) 
    
Own country, downgrade 0.363 0.458 0.222 
 ((1.609) (1.357) (0.727) 
Lag1 0.583* 0.747 0.266** 
 (1.918) (1.625) (2.373) 
Lead1 0.174 0.214 0.073 
 (0.448) (0.315) (0.617) 
    
Foreign country, downgrade 0.516*** 0.459** 0.538** 
 (3.516) (2.390) (2.254) 
Lag1 0.084 0.101 -0.108 
 (0.735) (0.657) (-0.670) 
Lead1 0.064 -0.032 0.136 
 (0.691) (-0.212) (1.454) 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.061 0.085 0.054 
Number of observations 15656 1965 13696 
Notes: same as in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.4 The Impact of Own Rating and Foreign Rating Changes (Thailand) 
Explanatory  Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) 
Variables Whole Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil
Period 
Whole 
Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil 
Period 
Constant -0.030 -0.086 -0.024 -0.037 -0.095 -0.029
 (-0.995) (-0.610) (-0.802) (-1.037) (-0.627) (-0.865) 
AR (1) 0.117*** 0.172** 0.100*** 0.115*** 0.167** 0.087*** 
 (4.267) (2.294) (3.701) (3.741) (2.281) (3.125) 
0.346*** 0.393*** 0.330*** 0.296*** 0.390*** 0.268*** US
tR 1−∆  (10.117) (3.422) (9.459) (8.453) (3.345) (7.710) 
Change in ratings:       
Own country 1.352** 1.738*** -0.159 1.244*** 1.512*** -0.617*** 
 (2.265) (5.166) (-0.064) (3.424) (3.571) (-3.039) 
Lag1 0.039 -0.224 0.443 -0.011 -0.360 0.678** 
 (0.096) (-0.459) (0.799) (-0.028) (-0.839) (2.147) 
Lag2 0.306 0.944 -2.945 0.802 0.985 -1.524 
 (0.288) (0.998) (-1.094) (0.839) (1.001) (-0.861) 
Lag3 -0.545 -0.751 -0.066 -0.622 -0.624 -0.300 
 (-0.519) (-0.547) (-0.065) (-0.570) (-0.430) (-1.135) 
Lag4 0.368 0.407 0.303 0.585 0.583 1.141** 
 (0.448) (0.412) (0.348) (0.710) (0.583) (2.123) 
Lead1 0.157 -0.727 3.447 -0.170 -0.729 2.394 
 (0.192) (-0.897) (1.084) (-0.228) (-0.884) (0.798) 
Lead2 -0.155 -0.078 -0.626 0.096 0.026 0.505** 
 (-0.531) (-0.242) (-0.649) (0.363) (0.089) (2.263) 
Lead3 0.796 0.540 1.490 0.715 0.629 0.922 
 (1.529) (1.346) (0.725) (1.483) (1.276) (0.462) 
Lead4 1.138*** 0.857* 1.934 0.987** 0.875* 1.032 
 (2.842) (1.863) (1.266) (2.342) (1.901) (0.830) 
Foreign countries    0.284** 0.664*** 0.083 
    (2.035) (2.652) (0.574) 
Lag1    0.196 0.098 0.178 
    (1.432) (0.390) (1.134) 
Lag2    -0.084 -0.153 -0.033 
    (-1.044) (-0.988) (-0.371) 
Lag3    -0.171 -0.362 -0.057 
    (-0.912) (-0.648) (-0.493) 
Lag4    -0.199 -0.407 -0.079 
    (-1.108) (-0.762) (-0.816) 
Lead1    0.020 0.002 -0.045 
    (0.223) (0.008) (-0.520) 
Lead2    -0.072 -0.034 -0.108 
    (-0.601) (-0.119) (-0.894) 
Lead3    -0.092 -0.052 -0.088 
    (-0.642) (-0.141) (-0.589) 
Lead4    -0.004 0.036 0.022 
    (-0.039) (0.118) (0.256) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.056 0.060 0.053 0.050 0.055 0.037 
Number of observations 3441 392 3049 2527 393 2135 
Notes: the dependent variables are changes in stock returns in Thailand. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. ***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.5 The Impact of Own/Foreign Country Upgrades/Downgrades (Thailand) 
 
Whole Period Crisis Period Tranquil Period
Constant -0.023 -0.078 -0.015 
 (-0.748) (-0.542) (-0.503) 
AR (1) 0.116*** 0.167** 0.098*** 
 (4.223) (2.248) (3.633) 
0.345*** 0.425*** 0.329*** US
tR 1−∆  (10.234) (4.000) (9.658) 
Change in ratings:    
Own country, upgrade -1.011**  -0.892** 
 (-2.161)  (-1.975) 
Lag1 0.680**  0.719*** 
 (2.550)  (2.701) 
Lead1 2.127  2.053 
 (0.803)  (0.772) 
    
Foreign country, upgrade 0.017 1.467*** -0.115 
 (0.100) (5.641) (-1.066) 
Lag1 0.148 0.860* 0.054 
 (0.779) (1.837) (0.278) 
Lead1 -0.072 -1.098*** 0.050 
 (-0.494) (-4.606) (0.332) 
    
Own country, downgrade 1.674** 1.544*** 4.634 
 (2.391) (3.963) (0.279) 
Lag1 -0.256 -0.305 -1.459 
 (-0.582) (-0.693) (-0.443) 
Lead1 -0.281 -0.797 11.474 
 (-0.345) (-1.006) (1.384) 
    
Foreign country, downgrade 0.502*** 0.483* 0.528*** 
 (3.252) (1.915) (3.429) 
Lag1 0.210 0.002 0.332** 
 (1.167) (0.009) (2.038) 
Lead1 0.113 0.205 0.008 
 (1.075) (1.070) (0.081) 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.058 0.073 0.055 
Number of observations 3447 393 3055 
Notes: the same as in Table 3.4. These are estimation results of Equation (3.3). 
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Table 3.6 The Impact of Own Rating and Foreign Rating Changes (Malaysia) 
Explanatory  Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) 
Variables Whole Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil 
Period 
Whole 
Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil 
Period 
Constant -0.009 -0.245 0.017 -0.015 -0.157 0.015
 (-0.324) (-1.359) (0.748) (-0.442) (-0.881) (0.516) 
AR (1) 0.100 0.070 0.130*** 0.093 0.063 0.126*** 
 (1.528) (0.485) (3.612) (1.245) (0.422) (2.956) 
0.339*** 0.662*** 0.274*** 0.327*** 0.634*** 0.250*** US
tR 1−∆  (9.541) (4.568) (10.844) (8.352) (4.165) (9.434) 
Change in ratings:       
Own country 0.137 0.412 -1.030** -0.086 0.163 -1.387** 
 (0.255) (0.507) (-2.244) -0.152 (0.203) (-2.475) 
Lag1 0.060 -0.277 0.588 (-0.026) -0.242 0.582 
 (0.111) (-0.468) (0.749) -0.047 (-0.373) (0.729) 
Lag2 0.800*** 0.593 1.098** 0.791*** 0.650* 1.364** 
 (3.212) (1.502) (2.205) (3.053) (1.651) (2.153) 
Lag3 -0.452 -0.635 - -0.405 -0.522 -1.069*** 
 (-0.807) (-0.742) (-5.018) (-0.673) (-0.580) (-5.315) 
Lag4 0.379 0.429 -0.242 0.425 0.447 -0.243 
 (0.587) (0.508) (-0.477) (0.636) (0.514) (-0.460) 
Lead1 -0.353 -0.611 0.474 -0.448 -1.025 0.854 
 (-0.369) (-0.599) (0.742) (-0.456) (-1.084) (1.095) 
Lead2 0.843*** 0.548 0.292 0.836*** 0.878** 0.136 
 (2.820) (1.362) (0.806) (2.576) (2.126) (0.360) 
Lead3 0.501 0.384 -0.244 0.628 0.296 0.263 
 (0.914) (0.501) (-0.901) (1.135) (0.347) (1.265) 
Lead4 -1.969* -2.021 -0.690* -2.068* -1.954 -0.693* 
 (-1.823) (-1.587) (-1.810) (-1.830) (-1.396) (-1.678) 
Foreign countries    0.459** 0.890*** 0.226 
    (2.349) (2.761) (0.982) 
Lag1    0.343** 0.552** 0.095 
    (2.526) (2.518) (0.640) 
Lag2    -0.021 0.042 -0.175 
    (-0.128) (0.127) (-1.210) 
Lag3    -0.129 -0.208 -0.075 
    (-1.333) (-0.813) (-0.775) 
Lag4    0.080 -0.027 0.139 
    (0.862) (-0.096) (1.379) 
Lead1    -0.094 -0.429* -0.051 
    (-0.883) (-1.894) (-0.694) 
Lead2    0.049 0.290 -0.060 
    (0.289) (0.643) (-0.927) 
Lead3    -0.097 -0.006 -0.158*** 
    (-0.412) (-0.008) (-3.097) 
Lead4    0.289** 0.616* 0.083 
    (2.269) (1.794) (1.478) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063 0.061 0.067 0.063 0.065 0.057 
Number of observations 3441 392 3049 2527 393 2135 
Notes: the dependent variables are changes in stock returns in Malaysia. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. ***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.7 The Impact of Own/Foreign Country Upgrades/Downgrades (Malaysia) 
 
Whole Period Crisis Period Tranquil Period
Constant -0.001 -0.195 0.020 
 (-0.033) (-1.102) (0.884) 
AR (1) 0.089 0.045 0.129*** 
 (1.326) (0.327) (3.569) 
0.343*** 0.678*** 0.271*** US
tR 1−∆  (9.484) (4.762) (11.811) 
Change in ratings:    
Own country, upgrade -1.117**  -0.992** 
 (-2.068)  (-2.051) 
Lag1 -0.072  -0.003 
 (-0.139)  (-0.005) 
Lead1 0.454  0.251 
 (0.795)  (0.463) 
    
Foreign country, upgrade 0.182 1.344*** -0.073 
 (0.743) (6.988) (-0.595) 
Lag1 0.281 0.687* 0.232 
 (1.171) (1.797) (0.890) 
Lead1 -0.028 -0.994*** 0.074 
 (-0.146) (-12.433) (0.447) 
    
Own country, downgrade 0.406 0.131 -1.407** 
 (0.742) (0.162) (-2.542) 
Lag1 -0.016 -0.242 8.506*** 
 (-0.023) (-0.408) (29.097) 
Lead1 -0.888 -0.908 11.021*** 
 (-0.817) (-0.975) (28.656) 
    
Foreign country, downgrade 0.744*** 0.747** 0.631* 
 (3.228) (2.151) (1.888) 
Lag1 0.306** 0.501** -0.133 
 (2.016) (2.221) (-0.880) 
Lead1 -0.124 -0.264 -0.067 
 (-0.981) (-1.141) (-1.213) 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.065 0.071 0.073 
Number of observations 3447 393 3055 
Notes: the same as in Table 3.6. These are estimation results of Equation (3.3). 
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Table 3.8 The Impact of Own Rating and Foreign Rating Changes (Korea) 
Explanatory  Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) 
Variables Whole Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil 
Period 
Whole 
Period 
Crisis 
Period 
Tranquil 
Period 
Constant -0.027 -0.078 -0.016 -0.024 -0.075 -0.013
 (-0.811) (-0.505) (-0.517) (-0.595) (-0.431) (-0.329) 
AR (1) 0.019 0.062 -0.001 0.038 0.074 0.022 
 (0.868) (1.223) (-0.035) (1.547) (1.401) (0.830) 
0.452*** 0.448*** 0.456*** 0.496*** 0.436*** 0.511*** US
tR 1−∆  (11.003) (3.432) (10.886) (10.687) (3.290) (10.648) 
Change in ratings:       
Own country 0.382 0.455 -0.457 0.358 0.520 -0.429 
 (0.960) (0.988) (-0.642) (0.892) (1.191) (-0.615) 
Lag1 1.625*** 1.794*** -0.047 1.595*** 1.727*** -0.145 
 (5.289) (6.054) (-0.059) (5.254) (6.163) (-0.178) 
Lag2 0.154 0.007 0.626 0.099 -0.017 0.553 
 (0.190) (0.007) (0.476) (0.121) (-0.018) (0.420) 
Lag3 0.390 0.312 1.011 0.383 0.335 0.957 
 (1.232) (0.881) (1.479) (1.141) (0.828) (1.418) 
Lag4 -0.447 -0.408 -0.904 -0.478 -0.334 -1.049 
 (-0.639) (-0.507) (-0.887) (-0.684) (-0.446) (-1.021) 
Lead1 0.373 0.403 -0.007 0.364 0.443 0.033 
 (0.451) (0.431) (-0.005) (0.437) (0.459) (0.023) 
Lead2 -0.004 0.106 -1.003 -0.024 0.076 -0.997 
 (-0.007) (0.202) (-0.704) (-0.047) (0.141) (-0.714) 
Lead3 0.249 0.292 0.155 0.261 0.198 0.142 
 (0.514) (0.512) (0.250) (0.529) (0.328) (0.225) 
Lead4 -1.153*** -1.226*** 0.186 -1.143*** -1.241*** 0.122 
 (-3.651) (-3.673) (0.424) (-3.713) (-3.906) (0.272) 
Foreign countries    0.104 0.493 0.033 
    (0.345) (1.321) (0.093) 
Lag1    0.057 0.268 0.016 
    (0.277) (0.451) (0.078) 
Lag2    -0.005 -0.346 0.092 
    (-0.026) (-0.633) (0.463) 
Lag3    -0.202 -1.355** 0.047 
    (-1.033) (-2.300) (0.448) 
Lag4    0.132 0.786* 
    (0.940) (1.838) (0.267) 
Lead1    0.065 -0.718 0.220* 
    (0.322) (-1.008) (1.658) 
Lead2    0.076 0.055 0.092 
    (0.499) (0.089) (0.735) 
Lead3    0.191 0.191 0.179 
    (1.271) (0.329) (1.443) 
Lead4    0.160 0.573 0.059 
    (0.841) (0.678) (0.590) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.070 0.064 0.085 0.075 0.085 
Number of obs. 3441 392 3049 2527 393 2135 
0.033 
Notes: the dependent variables are changes in stock returns in Korea. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. ***, **, * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.9 The Impact of Own/Foreign Country Upgrades/Downgrades (Korea) 
 
Whole Period Crisis Period Tranquil Period
Constant -0.010 0.001 -0.014 
 (-0.303) (0.007) (-0.433) 
AR (1) 0.021 0.076 -0.001 
 (0.964) (1.360) (-0.025) 
0.446*** 0.414*** 0.453*** US
tR 1−∆  (11.440) (3.269) (11.756) 
Change in ratings:    
Own country, upgrade -0.295 -0.353 0.025 
 (-1.179) (-1.569) (0.034) 
Lag1 0.865** 1.373*** -0.141 
 (2.178) (3.612) (-0.165) 
Lead1 -1.052 -1.662*** 0.204 
 (-1.335) (-4.943) (0.134) 
    
Foreign country, upgrade -0.330**  -0.399*** 
 (-1.971)  (-2.944) 
Lag1 0.177  0.178 
 (0.909)  (0.899) 
Lead1 0.235  0.249 
 (1.065)  (0.964) 
    
Own country, downgrade 0.666 0.789 -4.377*** 
 (1.245) (1.425) (-49.239) 
Lag1 1.894*** 1.842*** 0.438*** 
 (6.266) (6.285) (4.287) 
Lead1 1.003 1.101 -2.692*** 
 (1.093) (1.117) (-44.642) 
    
Foreign country, downgrade 0.574 0.521 0.646 
 (1.166) (1.467) (0.823) 
Lag1 -0.186 0.310 -0.534** 
 (-0.551) (0.553) (-1.968) 
Lead1 -0.076 -0.769 0.350* 
 (-0.194) (-1.113) (1.656) 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.071 0.077 0.068 
Number of observations 3447 393 3055 
Notes: the same as in Table 3.8. These are estimation results of Equation (3.3). 
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Table 3.10 Abnormal Returns around Sovereign Rating Changes 
 
 Rating upgrades  Rating downgrades 
 CAR N t-stat  CAR N t-stat 
Panel A: Own rating changes       
Whole period 0.0054 31 0.85  -0.0229** 36 -2.61 
Crisis period 0.0391 2 0.53  -0.0292** 23 -2.34 
Tranquil period 0.0031 29 0.57  -0.0117 13 -1.17 
        
Panel B: Foreign rating changes      
Whole period 0.0030 104 0.87  -0.0140*** 134 -3.51 
Crisis period 0.0619**
*
8 3.70  -0.0215*** 84 -3.53 
Tranquil period -0.0063 96 0.67  -0.0021 52 -0.70 
 
Note: CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for the event window of (-1, 1), estimated using the mean-
adjusted model. Market return is the return of the MSCI Asia-Pacific Market Index excluding Japan. N is 
the number of events. The whole period is from January 1, 1990, to March 21, 2003. The crisis period is 
from July 2, 1997, to December 31, 1998. The tranquil period is all other dates except the crisis period. 
*** and ** represent the significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.1 Current Account Balance and Foreign Liabilities in the Crisis Countries 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
A. Current Account Balance (% of GDP):     
Thailand -8.1 -8.1 -2.0 12.7 10.1 7.6 5.4 
Indonesia -3.2 -3.4 -2.3 4.3 4.1 5.2 n.a. 
Malaysia -9.7 -4.4 -5.9 13.2 15.9 9.3 n.a. 
Philippines -2.7 -4.8 -5.3 2.4 10.4 11.3 6.3 
Korea -1.7 -4.4 -1.7 12.7 6.0 2.7 2.0 
Hong Kong n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.4 7.3 5.5 7.4 
Taiwan 1.8 4.0 2.3 3.1 2.8 3.0 6.6 
Singapore 17.9 14.1 19.0 24.7 26.3 23.5 n.a. 
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
        
B. Foreign Liabilities in Deposit Money Banks (Billions of National Currency): 
Thailand 1164 1249 1904 1066 718 566 462 
Indonesia 26952 29744 70434 97842 100375 92674 68406 
Malaysia 16 28 48 35 28 26 23 
Philippines 168 378 616 498 483 515 449 
Korea 24361 36454 47418 35464 31348 31366 27964 
Hong Kong 4797 4486 4627 3465 2890 2488 2061 
Taiwan n.a. 483 489 479 462 458 540 
Singapore 66 77 105 84 89 102 115 
Thailand 1164 1249 1904 1066 718 566 462 
Source: International Financial Statistics from IMF. “n.a.” means “not available”. Data for Taiwan is from 
central bank of Taiwan. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Stock Returns and Exchange Rate Changes 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera 
Stock Return:      
Thailand -0.026 1.831 0.268*** 4.622*** 3111.013*** 
Indonesia -0.001 1.539 0.353*** 11.246*** 18247.266*** 
Malaysia 0.001 1.614 0.531*** 25.954*** 96963.928*** 
Philippines -0.002 1.612 0.556*** 8.882*** 11515.081*** 
Korea -0.013 1.994 0.0002 3.719*** 1987.565*** 
Hong Kong 0.034 1.669 -0.021 9.648*** 13376.878*** 
Taiwan -0.021 2.011 -0.030 3.130*** 1408.332*** 
Singapore 0.004 1.339 0.234*** 10.640*** 16299.706*** 
Japan -0.046 1.502 0.261*** 3.471*** 1770.943*** 
      
Exchange Rate Changes:     
Thailand 0.015 0.685 4.097*** 130.285*** 2448991.539*** 
Indonesia 0.047 1.941 2.693*** 83.078*** 996041.159*** 
Malaysia 0.010 0.556 0.082* 63.748*** 583998.268*** 
Philippines 0.027 0.708 1.504*** 58.809*** 498311.227*** 
Korea 0.018 0.894 -1.408*** 129.789*** 2421928.284*** 
Hong Kong -2.27E-05 0.035 -0.701*** 651.555*** 544802.851*** 
Taiwan 0.008 0.319 1.813*** 49.074*** 347977.469*** 
Singapore -0.002 0.367 -0.617*** 16.795*** 40755.535*** 
Japan -0.005 0.726 -0.824*** 8.001*** 9590.757*** 
Notes: The sample period is from January 1, 1990 to March 21, 2003. Stock returns are 100 times first 
differences of natural log of stock indices while exchange rate changes are 100 times first differences of 
natural log of exchange rates.  ***, **, * indicates significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Jarque-Bera statistics test for normality.  
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Table 4.3 Single Regime Model 
 
Note: Estimation results for Equation (4.1): , tt
US
ttt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 ),0(~ hNtε . LB2(15) is 
the Ljung-Box statistics for the squared residuals from the regression for up to 15 days. ***, **, *  
represent 1%, 5% and 10%  respectively.  
 µ  φ  ω  θ  LB2(15) 
Thailand -0.034 0.120*** 0.350*** 0.090** 1079.46*** 
Indonesia -0.007 0.194*** 0.258*** 0.003 725.87*** 
Malaysia -0.005 0.066*** 0.342*** -0.293*** 1357.34*** 
Philippines -0.006 0.171*** 0.332*** -0.172*** 228.66*** 
Korea -0.023 0.014 0.457*** -0.132*** 984.92*** 
Hong Kong 0.019 -0.015 0.593*** 1.305* 1325.92*** 
Taiwan -0.028 0.029* 0.362*** -0.236** 2718.17*** 
Singapore -0.009 0.102*** 0.428*** -0.241*** 650.20*** 
Japan -0.059** -0.058*** 0.415*** -0.011 483.36*** 
 
 
 100
Table 4.4 Two-Regime Model in Mean Equation with Constant Variance 
 
 
 µ  φ  ω  θ  h     P11 P22 LB2(15) Log likelihood
Thailand          -0.081*** -0.066*** 0.216*** 0.170** 1.589*** 0.832*** 0.199*** 302.62*** -6730.06
0.264* 0.935*** 0.784*** -0.180** [6] [1]
Indonesia          0.018 -0.073** 0.135*** -0.030 1.282*** 0.726*** 0.249*** 193.40*** -6021.51
-0.103** 1.043*** 0.491*** 0.116** [4] [1]
Malaysia          -0.008 0.239*** 0.255*** -0.036 1.369*** 0.955*** 0.305*** 1491.77*** -6131.95
0.042 -0.599*** 0.900*** -5.417*** [22] [1]
Philippines          0.007 0.037** 0.261*** -0.019 1.378*** 0.863*** 0.143*** 46.63*** -6231.00
-0.066 1.148*** 0.537*** -1.218*** [7] [1]
Korea          -0.119*** 0.018 0.396*** 0.0004 1.772*** 0.980** 0.381*** 275.49*** -7074.60
3.845*** -0.475*** 2.101*** -1.323*** [50] [2]
Hong Kong          0.092*** -0.036** 0.540*** 1.183 1.407*** 0.991*** 0.450** 289.60*** -6240.29
-5.565 -0.575 1.628 -7.275 [111] [2]
Taiwan   -0.206*   0.042 -0.217*** 0.264*** 1.812*** 0.771** 0.405*** 989.59*** -7149.61
 -0.189* 0.595*** 0.571*** -0.303      [4] [2]
Singapore 0.042         -0.101 0.305*** -0.139 1.108*** 0.783* 0.272*** 202.81*** -5490.29
-0.181** 0.735*** 0.823*** -0.109 [1]
Japan  0.378***   -6094.09 -0.046** -0.048*** -0.009 1.379*** 0.992*** 0.338*** 432.93***
-2.169*** -0.506*** 4.192*** -0.664*** [125] [2]          
   [5]    
          
          
       
          
       
       
Notes: Estimation results for Equation (4.2): , 
ttttt StS
US
tStSSt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 ),0(~ hNtSε . P11 and P22 is the transition probabilities. h is the 
constant variance. LB2(15) is the Ljung-Box statistics for the squared standardized residuals for up to 15 days. Log likelihood is the function value achieved by 
the estimation. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10%  respectively. Average number of days in each regime is calculated and shown in brackets.
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Table 4.5 Two-Regime Model in Mean Equation with Different Variances 
 
 
 µ  φ  ω  θ  h  P22   P11 LB2(15) Log likelihood
Thailand          -0.019 0.110*** 0.169*** 0.051 1.096*** 0.967*** 0.925*** 669.02*** -6410.34
 -0.069 0.117*** 0.635*** 0.107 2.732*** [30]    [13]
Indonesia          0.004 0.258*** 0.135*** -0.013 0.662*** 0.947*** 0.876*** 554.55*** -5273.44
-0.021 0.393*** 0.005 2.500*** [19] [8]
Malaysia  0.200***        0.009  0.172*** 0.106** 0.789*** 0.966*** 0.894*** 1194.22*** -5464.55
-0.053 0.014 0.675*** -0.390*** 2.765*** [29] [9]
Philippines  0.188***        -0.027 0.181*** -0.067* 0.891*** 0.965*** 0.933*** 146.33*** -5872.22
0.031 0.152*** 0.573*** -0.239*** 2.295*** [29] [15]
Korea    0.009   -0.034 0.018 0.169*** 1.143*** 0.981*** 0.972*** 594.35*** -6693.13
 0.006 0.654*** -0.151*** 2.688*** [53] [36]
Hong Kong 0.073***         0.029 0.435*** 0.922 0.983*** 0.982*** 0.956** 845.85*** -5893.94
-0.123 -0.051  2.409*** [56] [23]
-0.002 0.006 0.272*** -0.127 1.309*** 0.980*** 0.939*** 1346.80*** -6781.77
-0.094 0.036 0.547*** -0.497* 3.232*** [50] [16]
Singapore  0.139*** 0.322***       -0.004 0.052 0.776*** 0.973*** 0.909*** 445.84*** -5064.25
-0.009 0.065*** 0.574*** -0.516*** 2.150*** [37] [11]
Japan  0.069*   -0.044* -0.066*** 0.379*** 1.014*** 0.982*** 0.961*** 221.64*** -5866.52
-0.092 -0.060* 0.452*** -0.125 2.076*** [56] [26]     
     
  0.826*** 2.001     
Taiwan       
     
 -0.001     
     
     
  0.178***     
Notes: Estimation results for Equation (4.3): , 
ttttt StS
US
tStSSt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 ),0(~ tt SS hNε . P11 and P22 is the transition probabilities. LB2(15) 
is the Ljung-Box statistics for the squared standardized residuals for up to 15 days. Log likelihood is the function value achieved by the estimation. ***, **, *  
represent 1%, 5% and 10%  respectively. Average number of days in each regime is calculated and shown in brackets. 
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Table 4.6 Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Restricted Model Equation (4.2) Equation (4.4) Equation (4.3) 
Equation (4.3) Equation (4.3) Equation (4.5)-(4.7) 
3.62* 1596.94***
Indonesia    
    
Philippines    
    
    
    
   1245.58*** 
1496.14*** 0.24 2034.34***
Malaysia 1334.80*** 14.72*** 1847.26***
717.56*** 4.04** 1700.98***
Korea 762.94*** 7.10*** 1514.96***
Hong Kong 692.70*** 0.26 1432.66*** 
Taiwan 735.68*** 1.06 1614.36***
Singapore 852.08*** 12.22*** 1476.18***
Japan 455.14*** 3.72*
Unrestricted Model 
Thailand 639.44***   
Notes: Likelihood ratio test statistic is )(*2 ur LLLR −−= ,where and are the maximized values of the (Gaussian) log 
likelihood function of the unrestricted and restricted regressions, respectively. Under the null that the additional parameters are not 
jointly significant, the LR statistic has an asymptotic distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. For the 
second and the third columns, the critical values for )1(2χ  are 6.64, 3.84, and 2.71 at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. For the 
fourth column, the critical values for  are 13.277, 9.488, and 7.779 at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
uL rL
)4(2χ
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Table 4.7 Two-Regime Model in Mean Equation with Different Variances, but Constant Exchange Exposure 
 
 
 µ  ω  θ  h  P22   P11 LB2(15) Log likelihood
Thailand   0.169***       -0.020 0.111*** 0.078 1.093*** 0.966*** 0.923*** 680.61*** -6412.15
-0.067 0.115*** 0.632*** 2.727*** [29] [13]
Indonesia         -5273.56 0.003 0.258*** 0.136*** -0.004 0.660*** 0.946*** 0.877*** 560.57***
-0.020 0.177*** 0.392*** [19] [8]
Malaysia 0.006        0.195*** 0.172*** -0.079 0.793*** 0.967*** 0.896*** 1196.86*** -5471.91
-0.054 0.043 0.694*** 2.786*** [30] [10]
Philippines    -0.112***      -0.025 0.188*** 0.181*** 0.892*** 0.965*** 0.933*** 128.27*** -5874.24
 0.026 0.159*** 0.573***      2.301*** [29] [15]
Korea   0.168***   -0.033 0.016  -0.098*** 1.141*** 0.981*** 0.972*** 622.58*** -6696.68
-0.003 0.012 0.652*** 2.683*** [53] [36]
Hong Kong 0.072*** 0.029 0.434*** 1.059* 0.984*** 0.983*** 0.958** 875.98*** -5894.07 
-0.122 -0.052 0.827*** 2.409*** [59] [24]
Taiwan -0.003     1379.42***  0.004 0.273*** -0.162* 1.307*** 0.980*** 0.940*** -6782.30
-0.097 0.040 0.540*** 3.220*** [50] [17]
Singapore       0.907***   -0.005 0.138*** 0.324*** -0.046 0.782*** 0.974*** 460.98*** -5070.36
-0.014 0.079*** 2.191*** [38] [11]
Japan    -0.043* -0.067*** 0.382*** 0.026 1.008*** 0.982*** 0.962*** 227.75*** -5868.38
-0.090 -0.055* 0.451*** 2.064*** [56] [26]
φ  
       
   2.497***     
       
       
       
       
  0.579***      
       
Notes: Estimation results for Equation (4.4): , 
tttt St
US
tStSSt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111 ),0(~ tt SS hNε . P11 and P22 is the transition probabilities. h is the 
constant variance. LB2(15) is the Ljung-Box statistics for the squared standardized residuals for up to 15 days. Log likelihood is the function value achieved by 
the estimation. ***, **, *  indicates 1%, 5% and 10%  respectively. Average number of days in each regime is calculated and shown in brackets. 
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Table 4.8 Two-Regime GARCH (1,1) Model  
 
 
Notes: Estimation results for equation (4.3): , and equations (4.5)-(4.7): , 
, . 
ttttt StS
US
tStSSt XRRR εθωφµ ++++= −−− 111
2
12111111 ])1([] −−−− −+− tttt pp ττ [11 −− −= tt Rε
1
2
1, −− ++= tStSStS hh tttt βεαλ
12
2
121111
2
11111 )[1(][ −−−−−−− +−++= ttttttt hphph ττ ])1( 12111111 −−−− −+ tttt pp ττ t1τ  and t2τ  are the conditional 
means of the stock return in the two regimes respectively.  is the conditional probability of being in regime 1 at time t. The other notes are same as Table 4.4. tp1
 µ  φ  ω  θ  λ  α  βα
λ
−−1
 P11  P22 LB2(15) Log likelihood 
Thailand -0.128**          1.043*** 0.041 -0.093* 0.141*** 0.349*** 0.000*** 0.217 0.140*** 0.763*** 163.50*** -5616.87 
 0.003   0.134***       0.183*** 0.128*** 0.045** 0.560*** 0.022*** 0.664 [1] [4]
Indonesia 0.002            0.982*** 0.001 -0.020 -0.0001 0.516*** 0.085*** 0.000 0.464*** 0.158*** 305.27*** -4256.27
 -0.005           0.239*** 0.103*** -0.013 0.343*** 0.183*** 0.015* 0.428 [2] [1]
Malaysia -0.016**    0.249***   0.982**    0.314*** 0.107*** -0.004 0.269*** 0.062*** 0.390 0.904*** 775.95*** -4540.92
-0.100 0.549*** 0.292*** -0.224* 0.986 0.132*** 0.019*** 1.161 [56] [10]
Philippines -0.0004          194.40***  0.964*** 0.026 0.002 0.107*** 0.397*** 0.012 0.181 0.297*** 0.893*** -5021.73
 -0.017          0.225*** 0.149*** -0.058* 0.425*** 0.180*** 0.030*** 0.538 [1] [9]
Korea 0.038            0.992*** 0.038 -0.011 0.163*** 0.331*** 0.006 0.246 0.146*** 0.758*** 246.70*** -5935.65
 -0.035           0.123*** 0.144*** 0.021 0.616*** 0.122*** 0.012*** 0.711 [1] [4]
Hong Kong -0.162***        0.341*** 0.733***   0.792*** 0.131** 0.383 0.183*** 0.353*** 0.064*** 0.314 224.04*** -5177.61
 0.082**    0.138***       0.037** 0.286*** 0.602 0.502*** 0.006* 0.586 [2] [4]
-0.010 0.959*** 0.156** 0.072 0.226*** 0.299*** 0.020*** 0.332 0.655*** 219.19*** -5974.59
 -0.022          0.068*** 0.134*** -0.128** 0.619*** 0.112 0.014*** 0.708 [1] [3]
Singapore -0.048           0.841*** 0.203*** 0.071 0.129** 0.409*** 0.045 0.236 0.277** 0.747** 202.98*** -4326.16
 -0.004           0.141*** 0.184*** -0.068 0.391*** 0.178*** 0.018 0.486 [1] [4]
Japan 0.171***       0.255     0.639*** -0.071 0.062 0.140*** 0.354*** 0.098*** 0.208*** 0.714*** 144.70*** -5243.73
 -0.126*** 0.031          0.379*** -0.009 0.553*** 0.132*** 0.006** 0.642 [1] [3]
β  
           
Taiwan         0.117***    
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Appendix B: Figures 
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Figure 2.1 Daily Stock Returns (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
 
DLHK, DLIN, DLJP, DLKO, DLMA, DLPH, DLSG, DLSP, DLTH, and DLTW represent the stock 
returns of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the U.S., Thailand, 
and Taiwan. DL represents the log difference of the stock indices.  
 
 
 106
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
19
90
-1
-1
19
90
-7
-1
7
19
91
-1
-3
0
19
91
-8
-1
5
19
92
-2
-2
8
19
92
-9
-1
4
19
93
-3
-3
0
19
93
-1
0-
13
19
94
-4
-2
8
19
94
-1
1-
11
19
95
-5
-2
9
19
95
-1
2-
12
19
96
-6
-2
6
19
97
-1
-9
19
97
-7
-2
5
19
98
-2
-9
19
98
-8
-2
5
19
99
-3
-1
0
19
99
-9
-2
3
20
00
-4
-7
20
00
-1
0-
23
20
01
-5
-8
20
01
-1
1-
21
20
02
-6
-6
20
02
-1
2-
20
TH-IN TH-MA TH-KO TH-PH
 
Figure 2.2a GARCH-Corrected Correlations between the Stock Return of Thailand 
and Those of the Other Four Crisis Countries (1990-2003) 
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Figure 2.2b GARCH-Corrected Correlations between the Stock Return of Thailand 
and Those of the Other Four Crisis Countries (1997-1998)
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Figure 2.2c Pair-wise GARCH-Corrected Correlations between the Stock Returns of Five Hardest Hit Crisis Countries 
(1990-2003)
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Figure 2.3a GARCH-Corrected Correlations between Exchange Rates in Thailand 
and Those of the Other Four Crisis Countries (1990-2003) 
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Figure 2.3b GARCH-Corrected Correlations between Exchange Rates in Thailand 
and Those of the Other Four Crisis Countries (1997-1998) 
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Figure 2.4a GARCH-Corrected Correlations between the Stock Return of Japan 
and Those of the Other Four Crisis Countries (1990-2003) 
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Figure 2.4b GARCH-Corrected Correlations between the Stock Return of Japan 
and Those of the Other Four Crisis Countries (1997-1998) 
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Figure 2.5a Iterated Maximum Eigenvalue Statistics 
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 Figure 2.5b Iterated Trace Statistics 
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Figure 3.1 Ratings and Stock Indices (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
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Figure 3.1 Ratings and Stock Indices (1990-2003) (Continued) 
 
TH, IN, MAL, PH, and KO represent the stock indices in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea respectively. RTGF_TH, RTGF_IN, 
RTGF_MA, RTGF_PH, and RTGF_KO represent the ratings in corresponding countries. 
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Figure 4.1 Exchange Rates (vs. US Dollar) in Nine Asian Markets (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
FX_HK, FX_IN, FX_JP, FX_KO, FX_MA, FX_PH, FX_SG, FX_TH, and FX_TW represent the bilateral exchange rates in terms of 
local currency per U.S. dollar in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan.
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Figure 4.2 Exchange Rate Changes in Nine Asian Market (1/1/1990-3/21/2003) 
 
DLFXHK, DLFXIN, DLFXJP, DLFXKO, DLFXMA, DLFXPH, DLFXSG, DLFXTH, and DLFXTW represent the bilateral exchange rate 
changes (first differences in natural logs) in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. 
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Figure 4.3 Stock Returns and Conditional Probabilities of Being in “High Volatility” Regime 
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Figure 4.3 Stock Returns and Conditional Probabilities of Being in “High Volatility” Regime (Continued)
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Figure 4.3 Stock Returns and Conditional Probabilities of Being in “High Volatility” Regime (Continued) 
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